Why was Ireland involved in the Congo Crisis?
Ireland joined the United Nations (UN) in 1955 they were eager to make an impact on the world stage through neutrality. Membership of the UN obliged Ireland to follow certain requests. One such request was the Congo Crisis which seized the African Nation from 1960-1966 and was an event that both Irish Soldiers and Irish Diplomats were at the heart of. On July 19th 1960 Ireland sent 1,000 troops to join the peace keeping force Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) at the request of Dag Hammarskjöld the Secretary General of the United Nations. In June 1961 Dag Hammarskjöld selected Conor Cruise O’Brien as his special representative to The Congo. In the same year Ireland was elected to the UN Security Council.
Both Irish soldiers and diplomats failed to stop the momentum of the crisis and at the peak of Irish involvement Dag Hammarskjöld died whilst travelling by plane in an accident that was never explained. It is possible that Ireland’s involvement in the Congo Crisis caused more harm than good and that is certainly the opinion of the UN. This paper seeks to justify Ireland’s involvement in the Congo and to investigate if it was beneficial to the efforts of the UN and also to the Congo. This paper will examine the local and international interest groups in The Congo before and during the crisis, the UN and Irelands involvement in the area, with particular attention to the Irish Defence Forces and O’Brien’s contribution and the consequences of that engagement.
Ireland may have been involved in the Congo Crisis to protect Swedish neutrality by entrusting Irish representatives in key decision making positions in the Congo.
National & International Interest
The Congo Crisis occurred when the South-East Congolese province of Katanga seceded from the other five Congolese states. The North of Katanga is dominated by the Baluba Tribe whilst the South was under the control of the combination of the Luanda and the Bayeke tribes. These two tribes formed the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (Conakat) led by Moise Tchombe in 1959 and the Baluba tribe reacted by forming the Balubakat Cartel. In May 1960 Katanga held it’s first ever Provincial Assembly Elections and Conakat defeated Balubakat. Conakat did receive support from the white settlers of Katanga and there is rumour that these elections were corrupted to protect the white settlers of Katanga.
Katanga was the wealthiest state in the Congo, rich with copper, silver, platinum and uranium. These minerals caused Katanga to experience an influx of Western settlers from Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK). The numbers of settlers expanded from 4,824 in 1924 to 34,047 in 1956 a large contingent of these settlers were directly involved in mining companies. The Belgium Company Union Miniere worked closely with the British company Tanganyika Concessions Limited (Tanks) as Tanks could provide access to the Port of Lobito in Angola via the Benguela Railway Company. The principle stakeholders in the Union Miniere were the Belgium State (60%) and the British company Tanks (40%) and their interests were the exploitation of resources in Katanga, not the political climate of The Congo. Thus both Belgium and Britain were in favour of Katanga seceding from The Congo although they could not publicly show their support.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) declared itself a state on June 30th 1960 with Patrice Lumumba as its first Prime Minister forcing Belgium to withdraw from the country. Three days later Belgium dissolved its semi-state body: Comitespecial du Katanga, which had the power to appoint four of the six members of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. The newly established DRC had lost 184,746 votes to private share holders and had lost control of the mining companies of Katanga. The DRC Military kept Belgium officers in high ranks which caused a military mutiny within a matter of days. As the chaos of a newly established nation with a military mutiny raged Tshombe declared Katanga to be an independent state on July 11th 1960. Belgium and Britain thought favourably of Tshombe who represented the White Settler; some critics believe the settlers groomed him for his position.
Beyond Africa, the Cold War was creating a global frenzy. This allowed developing and recently independent states to play Capitalist West against the Communist East. The Eisenhower Administration had an economic interest in Katanga and even supported Belgium paratroopers and the bombing of Port Matadi. It is considered more then coincidence that Lumumba was assassinated days before Eisenhower left office. The UN Security Council passed Resolution [S4741] on 21st February 1961 which entitled ONUC to use force to prevent a civil war. In 1961 the Kennedy Administration entered office and began a new departure on the Congo Crisis by opposing the secession of Katanga. The United States of America (USA) felt that the remaining five states of the DRC might turn to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for assistance in removing Tshombe from Katanga. The USSR had supported Lumumba but could be interested in Katanga and Tshombe if Britain and Belgium were not involved. However, the USSR recognised that most African nations did not want secession for Katanga as it would threaten their own sovereignty.
On July 14th 1960 the UN, under worldwide pressured to intervene in the Katanga secession and did so in response to Patrice Lumumbas request by sending 14,000 troops to the region and demanding that Belgium withdraw their army. The UN entered the Congo as a neutral organisation on a peace keeping mission. On 17th January 1961 Lumumba was assassinated in Katanga. The perpetrators have never been brought to justice but the suspects include The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), General Mobutu (who had seized power by military coup September 14th 1960), and Minister for the Interior; Munongo or local Katanga villagers.
Irelands Defence Force Interest
At the time of the Congo Crisis Ireland had five years of experience as a member of the UN. Before joining the UN Ireland had little practice in international affairs but during those first five years Ireland experienced both success and failure. Ireland attempted to introduce 541 Hungarian refugees in 1956 adhering to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. By 1958 only 61 refugees remained in Ireland as the refugees emigrated further and even went on hunger strike. Ireland did experience limited success in the UN when Frank Aiken voted for three years in favour of talks regarding China joining the UN. This bold act against the wishes of the USA earned Ireland international respect as a neutral state which could not manipulated by world powers despite the USA reformulating the policy to suit its own interest.
On 19th July 1960 Dag Hammarskjöld requested Irish troops for a UN Peace Keeping mission in the Congo. Ireland supported the UN by supplying 6,191 members of the Irish Defence Force between July 1960 and June 1964, Sean McKeown was appointed Force Commander of UNOC from January 1961 to November 1962 and although Ireland had sent infantry abroad since joining the UN, they had never engaged in combat. Defending foreign territory is never easy; in September 1961 one company was intercepted at Jadotville, layed siege upon for four days and fooled into surrendering their arms by secessionists. Irish troops also entered combat with Belgium Mercenaries. A grim incident occurred on the 8th November 1960 at Niemba when Baluba tribesmen ambushed a regiment and killed nine Irish infantry. The public response to this atrocity and the six other deaths in the Congo was one of pride in Ireland. Finally the country could feel pride in the pursuit of peace after many years of war by defending neutrality as the conflict involved Europeans, Conakat secessionists and Baluba non-secessionists. Ireland entered the Congo unprepared and ill-equipped as they were flown out in an aircraft from the USA and they were going to a tropical climate sporting heavy jackets made of bull’s wool.
“It would be an exaggeration to believe that, even in this earlier period, Ireland always judged issues entirely on their merits and took absolutely no account of national interest or of relationships with important countries.”
Exactly why Ireland was involved in the Congo is a question not easily answered. A state in Africa experiences conflict resulting in a province stating independence and Ireland sends almost all its troops to help alleviate the situation.
It is possible that Ireland had an altruistic interest in the Congo and hence no sides were taken as those breaking the peace were from Europe as well as Africa. Ireland could not have believed that the UN was operating as a neutral organisation due to the strong influence from the USA coupled with the fact that the UN deployed forces to the Congo as soon as Lumumba implied the involvement of the USSR. Ireland may have involved itself in the Congo to achieve more influence internationally and the UN was the only international instrument in Ireland’s possession. However some critics conjure that Ireland entered the Congo solely with neutrality and white flags in mind.
Another possibility is that Ireland entered the Congo to bring international
attention to the Northern Ireland question. Although the question had been
answered in 1922 as Northern Ireland seceded from the Irish Free State under
the Anglo-Irish Treaty. This “national baggage” has since burdened those
on both sides of the border. If Ireland were to successfully defend neutrality and
in doing so united the Congo under the auspices of the UN then there would be a
realistic case to open ask the Northern Ireland question again based on a good result achieved through neutrality. However, not all of Ireland’s contributions were neutral as many Irish soldiers were involved in the looting of Leopoldsville making a “thorough job of it”. The massacred victims were unarmed civilians who were terrorised by Irish “Peace keeping” troops.
Jack McQuillan approached Taoiseach Sean Lemass about favouring Katanga above Northern Ireland,
“You can be a sore thumb about Katanga and partition, but you do not raise the question of our own Partition in the United Nations where you should. You are able to settle the problems of every country in the world except your own. Let us look after our own back garden first”
Lemass had no reply. Although the Congo Crisis could bring the Northern Ireland question to the international stage, perhaps more loyal faction of the country were frustrated by the efforts that Ireland was contributing to Katanga. Resources that could be used in Ireland.
A part success of Ireland in the UN involves
discussions about China joining the UN. This was an issue on the world stage pitting the honest USA against Red China. In this Ireland stood against Western Powers claiming that the UN was an international medium to solve problems and not a forum where states complemented each other. Ireland appeared to have much more in common with the USA then China at that time and it was difficult to justify Frank Aikens vote. However the issue that prevented China from joining the UN was an issue close to Irish hearts. Frank Aiken voted to include China in the UN but also to allow Formosa (modern day Tiawan) to have independence. Aiken wanted the island of Formosa to be independent and perhaps his reasons were rooted in Ireland’s own quest for freedom as an island to secede from the UK. This may explain Aiken persistence in voting for a discussion on China for three years and not promote the Peking Government.
However, considering Aikens later reaction to O’Brien’s Operation Morthor, it is unlikely he used the UN to promote the Northern Ireland problem. If Ireland had a hidden agenda in the UN from 1957-59 what could have changed such an agenda before the Congo Crisis. For Frank Aiken Irelands involvement in the Congo was “one of the great turning points of history” but could it be possible that Aiken was referring to Irelands own history and the possible outcomes of a united Congo inspired by Irish neutrality. If Ireland could prove capable of reuniting provinces to form a country in Africa through neutral means surely Ireland could unite its own provinces to form the state of Ireland., with similar means, perhaps involving UN peace keeping corps.
Article 25 of the UN Charter states “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”, therefore Ireland was compelled to oblige the UN Security Council.
However, in April 1961 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as part of the Border Campaign killed a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Following this the Department of External Affairs refused a request from the UN for more Irish troops to be sent to the Congo due to the heightened “tension” in Ireland. If Ireland was using the Congo Crisis for its own domestic non-partition campaign, surely the IRA would be aware of the consequences of their actions for the Congo campaign.
Irelands Diplomatic Interest
Irish diplomacy was at an all time high during the Congo Crisis. Freddie Boland was appointed President of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1960. He preceded over a gathering of possibly the most diverse world leaders. Central to the UNGA was the Congo Crisis and central to that was Ireland. Both Nikita Khruschev and Fidel Castro attended the Autumn UNGA where the truth of colonialism and its legacy were exposed. Boland’s role as President was not random and perhaps the UN wanted a neutral nation to lead proceedings when East meets West.
In November 1960 Noel Browne, an Independent TD, demanded that Taoiseach Sean Lemass assign a representative to the Congo. To which the Taoiseach replied
“We were not sufficiently informed about the situation in the Congo to make a proper appreciation of it, we should not, in my opinion, regard ourselves under any obligation to make that appreciation”.
This view expressed by the Taoiseach of Ireland contradicts the sheer volume of Irelands Defence Force deployed in the Congo and their efforts as instructed by Sean McKeown. Lemass did justify Ireland’s involvement in the Congo as a Christian duty and an obligation to the UN. However the UN appealed for Sean McKeown to be Commander of all UNOC forces which the government agreed to in December 1960. This promotion guaranteed that more Irish troops would be sent to the Congo.
On After four years representing Ireland as a member of the UN Assembly, Conor Cruise O’Brien was offered a promotion of sorts. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General, requested O’Brien work as part of the UN Secretariat as Special Representative to Elisabethville in Katanga. O’Brien believed that he was chosen by Hammarskjöld because he had voted pro-China alongside Aiken in the UN Assemblies.
“The reasons which deepened the hostility of the United Kingdom delegation, were also, I believe the reasons for my being invited by Mr Hammarskjöld to join the secretariat”.
He also believed Hammarskjöld was expressing an appreciation for his 1951 fictional work; Maria Cross. O’Brien faced numerous challenges in Katanga namely; Katanga’s secession, Lumumbas assassination and the ever dubious role of Union Miniere. Beyond international recognition for Katanga, Tshombes government also wanted to keep the industries which made Katanga so valuable. Instead of paying revenues to the Congolese government, Union Miniere was paying this surplus to Katanga, amounting to £14,000,000 per year.
This money in turn allowed Tshombe to build a sizeable army led by Belgium mercenaries and soldiers of fortune from South Africa and British Rhodesia. There were an estimated six thousand soldiers in Tshombes Gendarmerie movement compared with the UNs force of almost twenty thousand soldiers. O’Brien since his deployment had been busy trying to round up and deport all the foreign mercenaries that Tshombe had bankrolled, as it was legal for the UN to do so under UNSC Resolution [S4741].
On 28th August 1961 O’Brien launched Operation Rumpunch as authorised by Hammarskjöld. This was surprise disarmament of the Katanga troops, key military assets were seized and foreign mercenaries were captured. O’Brien also seized the control of radio, post and telephone facilities in Elisabethville. O’Brien made a radio announcement pleading his supporters to continue supporting the UN. By 11am Tshombe made a radio broadcast promising to remove foreign mercenaries from Katanga and the biggest prize of the swoop was the ever troublesome General Godefroid Munongo. A total of 350 soldier’s surrendered and over 80 mercenaries were captured.
Tshombe realised that Operation Rumpunch was an attempt to remove foreign mercenaries from his army and not an attempt to end the secession of Katanga. Tshombe did receive support from the Belgium and the UK prompting Hammarskjöld to announce that only a civil war by led by Tshombe would constitute another UN intervention. Operation Rumpunch was O’Brien’s greatest accomplishment in the Congo. The Belgium consular corps stopped Operation Rumpunch before it was complete, thus leaving many foreign mercenaries still in Katanga. Of the mercenaries that left Katanga many could re-enter via Northern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was this part success that inspired O’Brien to make another attempt to finally rid the Congo of the Katanga secession. O’Brien had to act because he knew Tshombe would not trust him after the surprise of Operation Rumpunch. The situation was at a peak as Baluba refugee camps were becoming overpopulated and under threat from Katangese soldiers The Congo informed the UN that it would seek USSR backing and invade Katanga backing unless they intervened immediately.
O’Brien had other intentions and began plotting another swoop. On September 12th against O’Brien’s request, Tshombe refused to repatriate his remaining mercenaries. This was the catalyst that made O’Brien launch Operation Morthor on 13th September, which translates from Hindi as Operation Smash. This aptly named mission would finish the work of Operation Rumpunch by seizing foreign mercenaries. Also included on the list were ministers of Katanga’s Government as well as Tshombe and Munongo. The arrest warrants were signed by the Congolese Government and not the UN Security Council. The aim was take over public buildings in Elisabethville, raise the Congolese flag and to surround the presidential palace and force Tshombe to surrender thus ending the secession of Katanga. The operation was a disaster finishing on 21st September with many on the arrest list escaped and 150 Irish troops stationed in Jadotville were surrounded for days and obliged to surrender. Tshombe escaped to Rhodesia which O’Brien claimed was aided by the British consul. O’Brien, however announced to correspondents that “The secession of Katanga is over”. Hammarskjöld had explained Operation Morthor in S/4940, however he neglected to mention the word Morthor or ending the secession of Katanga in his report. The report insisted that Katangese troops initiated the offence. O’Brien didn’t see this document until after the operation was over and so did not know what he was supposed to be defending;
“We could not understand what was now happening, since we did not know what was supposed to have happened”.
On 16th September Tshombe agreed to meet with Hammarskjöld in Rhodesia and as Hammarskjöld made his way there on September 17th, his plane crashed killing the UN Secretary General. Two separate investigations by the UN and Rhodesia proved inconclusive. Rhodesian authorities cited pilot error as the cause of the crash, ruling out foul play. The UN investigation didn’t rule out foul play but cited a lack of evidence to determine the exact cause of the crash. Major Delin and his aircraft the French-built Fouga Magister were immediately suspected of shooting down the craft Hammarskjöld travelled in; the Albertina. However the circumstances by which the tiny Fouga could have taken down the Albertina involve a lack of fuel for such a journey, lack of protection for the pilot if he were to offensively open fire and a lack of expertise to engage the craft as there was no-one qualified to drive the plane at night available. O’Brien, later contested that a bullet shot by a pro-secession undercover agent on the plane had hit a wire which caused the plane to lose control.
Although Akenson believes different, the UN Resolution [S4741] allowed the UN to remove foreign mercenaries in Katanga but it didn’t allow the UN to end secession. The events of 13th-21st September were unclear and neither O’Brien nor Hammarskjöld provided a similar chain of events. O’Brien believes that Hammarskjöld only used S/4940 to please the Belgium and British interest groups. Hence the question who gave the order becomes ever more important. The inconsistency of accounts regarding Operation Morthors origins begs investigation. O’Brien insisted the orders came from Dag Hammarskjöld to his assistant Mahmoud Khiary of Tunisia, Senior UN Officer in Leopoldville who provided the arrest warrants to O’Brien in Elisabethville.
However as Hammarskjöld was dead the unintentional suspect was O’Brien. Hammarskjöld was a great loss to the international community and received the only Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded posthumously in 1961 and he had the respect of John F. Kennedy. O’Brien was far from a Nobel Peace Prize, in fact his haste campaign had caused the death of many soldiers and the UN Secretary General as well as setting the secession troubles back. O’Brien’s reputation as a bullish character who acts on instinct did not work in his favour.
On October 15th 1961 Irelands permanent representative at the UN, Frank Boland, visited O’Brien and advised that he should be reassigned to New York. O’Brien insists that Boland recommended to Aiken that O’Brien be removed from the UN and then prompted the British to bypass the Foreign Minister and ask the Taoiseach, Lemass, to recall O’Brien. O’Brien refused to return to New York and remained in Elisabethville until December 1st 1961 when U Thant relieved him of his services.
On December 3rd 1961 O’Brien’s resignation letter was published, this caused international uproar shaming individuals, nations and international organisations. O’Brien stated his job in the Congo as to apply Resolution [S4741]. He then condemned the British and French Governments for passing the February resolution and then doing everything in their covert power to ensure it was not correctly applied. Their dishonest manoeuvres made O’Brien’s post impossible. 
When Willie Norton confronted Taoiseach Sean Lemass about O’Brien being “frustrated and thwarted by other countries” (Britain, Belgium and France), Lemass was quick to show his colours; “Dr. O’Brien was acting as an official of the United Nations, not as an official of the Irish Government….It seems to me the responsibility is on the United Nations, not on the Irish Government.”
When Dr. Noel Browne accused the Taoiseach of “washing his hands” of the affair to favour the mining companies of Katanga, Lemass retorted that he had no responsibility for the actions of O’Brien as he was now a private individual. There can no doubt that O’Brien was used as a scapegoat in this situation. Regardless of the outcome of Morthor and Rumpunch his own government had turned their back on him; refusing to be involved but also refusing to recognise him.
Why Ireland was so Involved
Ireland had a unique position in the aftermath of World War II (WWII) having remained neutral, maintained a type of allegiance to the Allies but also expressed sorrow at the loss of Hitler. Ireland was too small a state to threaten any of the big world powers and also had no colonial history in Africa that would conjure mal- sentiments.
Sweden, like Ireland, also remained neutral during WWII and was not included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nor was either a founding member of the UN. The Swedish model was something to envy, it “implied independence from all big power-blocs and –even in the event of war between the blocs a maintenance of complete independence…a good deal of moral righteousness”. Perhaps when Dag Hammarskjöld, the first Swedish Secretary General, appointed O’Brien to his position he was looking to safeguard Sweden’s international reputation. Sweden had earned an impeccable status in the UN and Hammarskjöld knew that the Congo Crisis was too big an issue to take on in his own role and it was too fragile an issue to risk assigning a Swedish diplomat. Hammarskjöld knew when he assigned O’Brien that the Irishman had proved difficult towards the larger nations at the UN and that the UK had a particular dislike of him.
Hammarskjöld knew the Congo Crisis was impossible to solve especially when Western Powers were on both sides of the fence; Belgium, the UK and France acting pro-secession of Katanga and the USA and remainder of the UN were anti-secession. If the Congo Crisis could not be solved without stepping a few Western toes it was better to pass the poison chalice to an unknown scapegoat, rather then risk jeopardising Sweden’s international reputation. The subsequent actions of O’Brien caused his fellow countrymen to turn on him; Dr. Noel Browne believed “We stood by the assassination of Mr. Lumumba and now we are standing by the diplomatic assassination of Dr. Conor Cruise O’Brien”
There were two main differences between Operation Rumpunch and Operation Morthor. Operation Rumpunch was successful and authorised by Hammarskjöld. Morthor was unsuccessful and not publicly authorised by Hammarskjöld. The motivation for both operations was the same; to end secession, however only one operation could justify its agenda. If operation Morthor was authorised by Hammarskjöld, Lemass would have praised it. The reason being that regardless of the outcome Sweden’s position among the world powers as a magnificent paradigm of neutrality was an example to emulate.
For Lemass to agree with O’Brien’s actions would cause embarrassment to our own national reputation. Perhaps O’Brien was ordered to instigate Operation Morthor, if so it was an order from the Western interested parties in the UN. Knowing that it there were Western powers on both sides of the fence, it was best to reject O’Brien entirely as an Irish Diplomat. In which case we could still take a neutral position and allow O’Brien test the waters of international opinion. Whilst Hammarskjöld became Nobel Peace Prize Winner and Sweden’s international reputation grew stronger, O’Brien had to resign from the UN to tell the truth. McKeown agreed with O’Brien that he had been prevented by doing his job by the very people that asked him to do it.
When the facts, in particular the economic alliances that benefitted from O’Brien’s decision are considered the situation becomes rather transparent. Irish troops were withdrawn from the Congo. Frank Aiken seemed convinced that the Irish contingent had performed their job and the Congolese leaders had finally seen the only solution was peace but when pressed during the same session Aiken evaded the question had Irish troops attempted reunite the Congo by force ? Ireland had compromised its neutrality during Rumpunch, Morthor and even the attack incited on innocent civilians in Leopoldsville. Ireland had sacrificed its position as a neutral state and engaged in combat with another nation. Sweden had not done so because their involvement was providing troops and ordering the successful Operation Rumpunch. Ireland conversely had provided troops, ordered the failure of Operation Morthor as well as providing the Force Commander of UNOC. Sweden also sacrificed an international martyr for peace whose departure absolved him from any allegations of ordering Operation Morthor.
The Irish Defence Forces had represented Ireland well in Katanga, besides the fact that they were in combat as a neutral peace keeper. A total of twenty six Irish troops died in Katanga of whom the nation was very proud. The compensation for these soldiers was also very high in respect of the times; Irl£3,500. was the price of a married man and Irl£2,000 was the price of a single man. Letters of condolences came from both England and the USA. Despite the incident at Leopoldsville where Irish troops were involved in raiding a community, these soldiers had defended the peace for the representing the Irish people in a battle between the super powers. But how neutral was Ireland ? Definitely not as neutral as Sweden.
The series of events in The Congo can only render Ireland culpable which was perhaps why; beyond the public reasons of neutrality and lack of colonial history, Sweden and Hammarskjöld insisted on Ireland’s involvement at the helm of operations. O’Brien’s appointment remains an invalidated shock and although the Irish Defence Forces involvement can be justified, the power ceded to the unprepared McKeown clad in a bulls wool jacket can’t. These appointments question why Sweden gave up two positions of power. Perhaps Hammarskjöld knew The Congo was about to erupt and Western interests on both sides of the fence would mean forfeiting neutrality and possibly making enemies.
Regardless of McKeon’s promotion being a method of obtaining more soldiers, the fact still remains that Sweden did provide more troops in Katanga. That said, McKeown was in charge of implementing orders. This may have been another clever ploy from Hammarskjöld to maintain Sweden’s strong involvement without having to jeopardise allocating a position of power which could be held liable, in turn making Sweden accountable. Therefore risking Swedish neutrality. Sweden put the largest number of soldiers into Katanga but held no responsibility for them. Ireland was proud of McKeown and his troops, however O’Brien became the scourge of the nation and his only followers were the ever opportunistic opposition party.
By the same spineless accord, Lemass recognised O’Brien only as an individual that worked for the UN, answerable to the UN, who then became a private individual, he thus eliminated Ireland from involvement in the disaster of Operation Morthor. Despite a barbaric attack on locals in Leopoldsville, the Irish Defence Forces were welcomed as heroes, without questioning why McKeown readily accepted O’Brien’s orders on September 13th. Thereby Ireland was still a neutral country, unfortunately involved in Operation Morthor as it was ordered by a private individual working for the UN, O’Brien, the scapegoat.
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NAI, DT, Memo for Government from DFA, 26/4/1961, File S16137H/61
Dail Debates,23/11/1960 Vol 185, No 1, Columns 1-3
Dail Debates,23/11/1960 Vol 185, No 1, Columns 164-176
Dail Debates, 15/11/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 171-172
Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245
Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1248
 Saideman, S., 2001,“The ties that divide: ethnic politics, foreign policy, and international conflict”, New York, Published by Columbia University Press, pp39
 Ministere des Colonies Belgique, 1947,“Report Annuel sur la Colonie du Congo Belge en 1924”, pp.258, featured in Lemarchand, R., 1962, “The Limits of Self-Determination : The Case of the Katanga Secession”, Rene Lemarchand, The American Political Science Review, Published American Political Science Vol. 56, No.2 p.404-416
Ministere des Colonies, statistics, 1959, “La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda Urundi en 1958”, Ministere des Colonies. pp.22, featured in Lemarchand, R., 1962, “The Limits of Self-Determination : The Case of the Katanga Secession”, Rene Lemarchand, The American Political Science Review, Published by American Political Science,Vol. 56, No.2 pp 404-416
 Hughes, M., 2007, Canada,“Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis 1958-1965”, International History Review Vol. 25 Chap. 3 pp 595
 Goncharov, L., 1963, “New forms of Colonialism in Africa” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 468-9, New York, Cambridge University Press
Emmanuel, A., 1972, “White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism” New Left Review I/73, pp. 40. London, Published by Verso
Gibbs Gibbs, D., 1991,“The political economy of Third World intervention: mines, money, and U.S. policy in the Congo crisis” London, Published by University of Chicago Press, pp 103-110
 Wright, G., 1997, “The destruction of a nation: United States’ policy towards Angola since 1945”, Bristol, Published by Pluto Press, pp 26.
 Ibid p.28
 UN Security Council Resolution [S4741] Available http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1961/scres61.htm
 U.S. Department of State Office of The Historian, 13/01/1995 Foreign Relations, 1961-63, Vol. XX, Congo Crisis, Available http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/summaries/950113_FRUS_XX_1961-63.html , date Accessed 4/5/09
Wright, G., 1997, “The destruction of a nation: United States’ policy towards Angola since 1945”, Bristol, Published by Pluto Press, pp 27
 UN resolution [S/4387] Available www.un.org/arabic/documents/GADocs/A_4510english.pdf
Ward, E., 1996, “A big show-off to show what we could do” – Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956″, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7 (1996), 131-141, Dublin, Published by: Royal Irish Academy, pp 137
 Dowling, C., 1996, “Irish Policy on the Representation of China at the United Nations, 1957-59”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7, 81-95. Published by: Royal Irish Academy. pp 157
 English, Adrian J. 2005. “Irish Army Orders of Battle 1923-2004”, Maryland USA, Published by Ravi Rikhye, pp 55
 O’Halpin, E., 1999, “Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922”. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp 271
 English, Adrian J. 2005. “Irish Army Orders of Battle 1923-2004” Published by Ravi Rikhye, pp 55
 Tonra, B., Ward, E., Keatinge, P., 2002, “Ireland in international affairs: interests, institutions and identities: essays in honour of Professor N.P. Keatinge, FTCD, MRIA”, Ireland, Published by Institute of Public Administration. pp 115
 Ishizuka,K.,. 2004, “Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000: A Study of Irish Motivation”, London, Published by Routledge. pp 29
 Irish Independent. 11th April 1962 “UN Troops in Katanga are accused”, pp 1
 Dail Debates, 15/11/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 171-172
 O’Connor, J., 1966, “Frank Aiken Oral History Interview – 9/15/1966”, Administrative Information for JFK Library. Place of Interview: Dublin, Ireland. -. Available http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Oral+History+Project/Aiken_Frank_09_15_66_oh.htm Date Accessed 3/5/09
 Irish Times Reporter, August 17 1960, The Irish Times August 17 1960, pp 9
 UN Charter http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter5.shtml
NAI, DT, Memo for Government from DFA, 26/4/1961, File S16137H/61
 Dail Debates,23/11/1960 Vol 185, No 1, Columns 1-3
 Dail Debates,23/11/1960 Vol 185, No 1, Columns 164-176
 O’Brien. C.C., 1962, “To Katanga and back: a UN case history”, New York, Published by Simon and Schuster, pp 50
Wheatcroft, G. 2003 “No Regrets, no surrender”, featured in The Guardian 12th July 2003
 Packham, Eric S. 1996. “Freedom and anarchy”. New York, Published by Nova Publishers. P 28
 Moraes, F.,1965,“The importance of being black: an Asian looks at Africa”, New York, Published by Macmillan, pp 208
 De Waal, A., 2002, “Demilitarizing the mind: African agendas for peace and security”, Trenton NJ, Published by Africa World Press, pp 117
 Meisler, S., 1997, “United Nations: The First Fifty Years”, New York, Published by Atlantic Monthly Press, P124
 Sitkowski, A., Mazowiecki, T., 2006, “UN peacekeeping: myth and reality”, Westport CT, Published by Greenwood Publishing Group, pp71
 O’Neill, J. Rees, N., 2005, “United Nations peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era” New York, Published by Taylor & Francis, pp52
 Meisler, S., 1997, “United Nations: The First Fifty Years”, New York, Published by Atlantic Monthly Press, P125-127
 Mahoney, Richard D. 1983. “JFK: ordeal in Africa”, New York, Published by Oxford University Press, 1983, pp100
 O’Brien, C.C., 1962, “To Katanga and back: a UN case history”, New York, Published by Simon and Schuster. P 268.
 O’Brien, C.C., 1999, “Memoir: My life and Themes”, London, Profile Books London, P228
 Rosio, B. 1993, “The Ndola Crash and the Death of Dag Hammarskjold”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 661-671. New York, Cambridge University Press
 O’Brien,C.C., 1992, Article appearing in the “The Guardian” 11th September 1992
 Harman Akenson, Donald. 1994. “Conor; A biography of Conor Cruise O’Brien”, Canada, McGill-Queens University Press. P170 Akenson believes O’Briens actions were in line with his position under UN Mandate of Resolutions
 John F. Kennedy, 25th September 1961 address to UN General Assembly in New York City, referring to Hammarskjölds death as “A noble servant of peace is gone” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03UnitedNations09251961.htm , Date Accessed 5/5/09
 O’Brien, C.C., 1999, “Memoir: My life and Themes”, London, Profile Books London, pp 244
 O’Brien,C.C., 1961, Resignation Letter featured in New York Times and London Observer 3rd December 1961
 Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245
 DeRouen, K., Heo, U. 2005, “Defense and Security: A Compendium of National Armed Forces and Security Policies” Santa Barbara California, Published by ABC-CLIO. Explains how Ireland provided military intelligence to UK during WWII and allowing ally planes to pass over Ireland
 Lightbody, B., 2004, “The Second World War: ambitions to nemesis”, London, Published by Routledge, pp258
 Salmon, T. 1989, “Unnuetral Ireland an ambivalent and unique Security Policy”, Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 48-81
 Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1248
 Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245
 Dail Debates, 15/11/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 168
 NAI, DT, Cabinet Minutes 29/11/1960, File S16965
 NAI, DT, Letters of condolences, File S16965
 Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245