As a former student I realise how important the work of others is and so I would like you to be able to use development-theory.org not as a reference but as a general direction provider type thingy.

Also, creating websites allowed me to afford going back to college (more on that later) so once I finished my MA I realised I had over 80,000 words in high quality essays and academic research sitting in word documents on my laptop- at least my work can be useful to someone and I did it so why not showcase it, right ?

Some of my work is quite personal and relies on my own experiences and so I would ask you to consider what you may use from this website. Until September 2009 I too was a student so I am aware of how easy it is to copy paste and edit.

One good reason why I did an MA in Development studies comes from the traveling I did in Africa when I cycled from Cairo to Capetown you can see my blog from this epic journey here Conor Devine’s African blog.

My journey made me realise there is a lot of negative press for Africa and these are lies. Organisations and rich countries are stealing resources and applying interest upon the interest of a loan somebody accepted usually just after World War II.

Always check dates and facts with a primary source.

The subject which interested me the most, needless to say, was African Studies:

This module aims to introduce students to recent developments in the politics of sub-Saharan Africa, and provide them with the theoretical and conceptual tools to evaluate and analyse these developments. The diversity of countries, languages, cultures, histories and political structures on the continent make this a challenging course, but by approaching the politics of the region through the lens of state-society relationships it addresses issues including the colonial legacy, nationalism, ethnicity, neo-patrimonialism, structural adjustment, democratisation, environmentalism, conflict and the ‘African Renaissance’. The peculiarities of the African state and its relationship to both domestic societies, as well as to the international system, will provide a conceptual focus to the module.

African Studies Syllabus

1)Introduction and overview of course themes
2)Colonialism and its Legacies
3)Nationalism and the Post-Colonial State
4)Ethnicity in African Politics
5)Conflict and the Failed State
6)Africa in the International System
7)READING WEEK
8)Poverty, Development and Structural Adjustment
9)Democratisation
10)Partnerships: African environmentalism
11)NEPAD and the ‘African Renaissance’
12)Review class.

Does the end of the Thabo Mbeki-era in South Africa spell the end of the African Renaissance

“In regard to South Africa, much has been expected of her since she achieved majority rule in 1994, in virtually every area of government, both by the international community and by the African states themselves”1

Thabo Mbeki created the African Renaissance providing hope to millions across the entire continent of Africa. Reforms and policies both domestic and international would shine a bright ray of optimism across the Dark Continent. This philosophy rekindled the historical importance of pre-colonial Africa as a world power and proposed a rebirth of that continent. The principles could liberate the marginalized of society, such as women, the poor and the old by ameliorating economic growth and expanding the reaches of democracy all under the auspices of a rejuvenated African spirit.

The African Renaissance wanted to provide African solutions to African problems. This paper aims to discover when this renaissance began and when it finished. The proponents of the African renaissance will be examined such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). The employment market as well as the effects of AIDS, Mugabe and international trade on the renaissance will also be investigated. To understand why Thabo Mbeki was the catalyst for this movement we must briefly inspect the state of affairs in South Africa at that time.

The beginning of the African Renaissance was when Nelson Mandela was elected President of South Africa in 1994. A new era of democracy had dawned on Africa though not without its casualties as Sub Saharan Africa experienced a sharp drop in Official Development Aid (ODA) as it was reduced from US$17.3 billion in 1990 to US$1.6 billion in 19992. Nonetheless there was a sense of confidence heralded by Nelson Mandela and his Deputy President of South Africa; Thabo Mbeki. Further to the reduction in development aid, Africa was suffering from the “brain drain” whereby millions of Africans left the continent during the 1980’s and 1990’s at a cost of both capital and value for investors3.

This was severely felt as a mass migration of labour skills from South Africa to Europe and North America, a maximum of 1.6 million skilled professionals emigrated between 1994 and 2004. South Africa lost 25% of its graduates to the United States of America (USA) as well as accounting for 9.7% of all international medical graduates practicing in Canada. Over the past thirty five years 45% of the qualified physicians from Witwatersrand University have emigrated4. The problem was South Africa’s Affirmative Action reform whereby skilled white labour was replaced by non-skilled labour which was prioritised because of skin colour and not by suitable qualifications.

“There is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about a new African renaissance”5

Although Mandela first introduced the term African Renaissance, Mbeki provided the real introduction of the term in a speech to the Corporate Council at the “Attracting capital to Africa” Summit in America in 1997, Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech was the start of the African Renaissance, where he stated that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white”6. However this statement can only be a lie if Mbeki is willing to promote inequality in the workforce.

Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) was introduced in 2007 but can only serve to further isolate the presence of skill in the South African workforce. Furthermore, Statistics South Africa in 2004 calculated that the black population earn the lowest incomes. Estimates suggest that 40% of African employed people earned under R1000 a month, more then 50% of African women earned under R1000 a month. Additionally, only 60% of African families reported wages, salaries or profits as their key supply of income, compared to 80% of whites, Coloureds and Asians. Other households relied on social grants, family remittances, charity and pensions. Even ten years after South Africa broke the shackles of apartheid, South Africa had yet to liberate its labour market.7

Mbeki established a need for Africa to unify in his “I am an African” speech, a way of knitting the strands of countries together to form a world power. Mbeki’s vision of an African Renaissance had major obstacles such as the Rwandan Genocide and the Civil War in Somalia to overcome and the only country which exhibited some stability was South Africa, which despite being hampered by a brain drain of qualified white workers, still enjoyed the best position to provide to an African market. The troubles of apartheid had segregated South Africa from the continent for decades but Mandela changed that and made the dream of an African market tenable.

Beyond the troubles in war torn states of Africa there was also a need to reduce state intervention. Many African autocracies were built by large influential governments, although Botswana’s success has proved the contrary, reducing state intervention is paramount to achieving a renaissance. Africa would need the West to help it rebuild Africa.

“By coming and going, a bird builds its nest. We will come and go with you and do all we can as you build the new Africa, a work that must begin here in Africa, not with aid or trade”8

Despite good intentions, Clinton did have a plan for Africa involving trade. It is argued that before Africa makes another attempt at international trade, it first needs to meet supply with demand of its most abundant resource; land.9 However the World Trade Organisation with policies of free trade has forfeited Africa’s fortuitous fortune. Clinton’s vision for Africa was to select promising African leaders, including Mbeki, who were devoted to African unity, democracy and economic reform.

Other selected leaders include Meles Zenawi from Ethiopia and Isias Afwerki of Eritrea, both of whom engaged in a two year border war resulting in an estimated 70,000 deaths within months of Clinton selecting them.10 Yoweri Musevini of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda were also a part of Clinton’s plans, however months later both Uganda and Rwanda engaged in conflict in the Congo in what was termed “The Great War of Africa”.11 Uganda and Rwanda subsequently fought each other for the resources recovered. These outbreaks of war had become almost predictable and were enough to scare away Clinton and his American investors.

Meredith12 uses the example of cotton production in West Africa to illustrate the vulnerability of an African market. Cotton production in West Africa soared from 100,000 tons in 1960 to 900,000 tons in 2002. In Benin, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Togo cotton represents between 5-10% of GDP, at least 33% of export income and 60% of agricultural exports. Production costs in West Africa are about US.38c a pound. Production costs in the USA are a minimum of US.76c.

However the 25,000 farmers in the USA receive a subsidy of US$4b per year. This is more then the value of the entire crop and enables the USA to export cotton at one third the cost it takes to produce. This enabled the USA to steal one third of the world market and has resulted in a 25% drop in world cotton prices.

This equates to 1% of GDP in Burkina Faso or 12% of its exports and 1.7% of GDP or 12% of exports in Mali. The sum loss of these exports to West Africa easily outweighed the benefits of Aid from the USA. China and the European Union also provide US$1b in cotton subsidies per year. Regardless of these setbacks in West Africa increased its cotton production by 14% between 1998 and 2002. The World Bank (WB) estimate that removing cotton subsidies would raise West Africa exports by 25%. Other subsidised products which price Africa out of the world market include Dutch onions, Italian tomatoes, European sugar and Asian rice.13

The AIDS crisis in South Africa proved an unsurpassable barrier for Mbeki’s African Renaissance as the situation worsened during his presidency. Beyond the increasing numbers of people infected with the fatal disease and despite almost six million people being infected, Mbeki has also displayed ignorance of the disease by denying that HIV caused AIDS and by not providing adequate amounts of Anti Retroviral Treatment (ART)14. In 1996 South Africa’s Medicine Control Council (MCC) refused to grant a licence to a group of academics from Pretoria University who created Virodene, a possible cure for AIDS. The researchers stipulated that the MCC had rejected the drug because the regulator was protecting a foreign pharmaceutical company. Mbeki took the appropriate steps to fast track the drug to the market and ensured that Peter Folb was removed from as Chief of the MCC.

Unfortunately Mbeki had not investigated the procedures that Virodene had been tested under. The story broke that the drug had been tested on humans only and mandatory laboratory testing procedures on animals had not been observed. Virodene contained dimethylformamide which can cause irreparable damage to the human liver which Mbeki, the patron of the drug, did not know. The caused much embarrassment for Mbeki who had trumped the drug as a success, perhaps only to beat Western drug companies to it. Mbeki’s vision of an African solution failed.

In 1999 Colonel Gaddafi proposed forming the United States of Africa, with a continental president, single currency and combined military force. It may have been too soon for such a structure in Africa but it laid the foundations for the African Union, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2001. The inaugural meeting was held in Durban and leaders attended from fifty three states. Amidst the fanfare of celebrations Gaddafi arrived with an entourage of 600 officials and sixty armoured cars. The event was attended by one of the most undemocratic African congregations ever and was an excuse for each leader to show off their wealth. If an African Renaissance was to happen Mbeki must have now realised that he could not rely on the leaders to act responsible and democratic so as to attract international investment.

NEPAD is the merger of two plans for the future of Africa. The two components are the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan which was prepared by Abdoulaye Wade President of the Republic of Senegal. MAP, a vague set of guidelines often contradictory, was focused on democracy and good governance and the OMEGA Plan, with specific procedures, was resolute on economic growth and development15.

President Mbeki, Former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria formed the nucleus of NEPAD at the 37th session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia as was previously agreed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The principles of NEPAD are to eradicate poverty, placing African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development, to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy and to hasten the empowerment of women.

Central to NEPAD was the establishment of policies to integrate African countries in economic harmony through peace and security; democracy and good, political, economic and corporate governance, Regional co-operation and integration as well as capacity building. The Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) comprises of three states per AU region and reports to the AU Summit on an annual basis.16 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was also established compromising of a “self-assessment” questionnaire.

NEPAD sought to provide an African model of trade, this would need ODA support to get started but once established it could propel the continents growth. NEPAD wanted Western countries to provide ODA at .7% of GDP, the cost to Western states would be US$64b per year, over a fifteen year period to NEPAD’s members. This would reduce poverty by half by 2015. NEPAD in represented in the United Nations (UN) by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), NEPAD has provided projects like The Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF), Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and an e-schools programme.

“Currently there is no strong sponsorship of cross-border infrastructure projects by national governments” 17

Nkulhu, former Chief Executive of NEPAD felt that in 2008, seven years after its establishment, NEPAD had not achieved cross-border policies for an African market but he did report that foreign aid was received in substantial amounts. In the same address, Nkulhu refers to the fact that many of the NEPAD countries had received debt cancellation as a result of the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit. An African Renaissance and debt cancellation are poles apart. In 1998 Tanzania was indebted to the WB US$575m for twenty six failed agriculture projects18, WB Operations and Evaluation Department confessed they didn’t collaborate with the local knowledge of Tanzanian people. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), content with Tanzania’s efforts considered them for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status in 1999 this would cancel their debt, but at a price. There were seventy eight conditions including breaking-up the national electricity system, a redirecting of credit away from development projects and a removal of restrictions on imports and exports. From this moment on the IMF owned Tanzania. They could export all national resources whilst flooding local markets with subsidised goods from the west, like cotton. Health and education, which was traditionally high in Tanzania, dropped to levels not seen before.

The London-based World Development Movement found that of the 450 conditions the World Bank and the IMF imposed on agreements with 50 countries, only 11 weren’t based on the Washington Consensus formula.19 If NEPAD is to provide an African Renaissance it will result in heavy debt, followed by open economies and markets for donor states, only. Africa’s ability to provide its own economy won’t require aid but action. As mentioned previously, if Western donor states to reduce or cull cotton subsidies, the cotton market would increase in Africa but when money is provided as aid to politicians the funds are usually mismanaged. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, the man who proposed the Omega Plan, accused NEPAD of squandering millions of dollars on hotels and wasting time at meetings where nothing happens. He also cited how less then half of NEPAD’s members signed to APRM.20 Africa’s age old problem of misused capital was bearing fruit once again.

“Events in Zimbabwe during the last decade and especially since 2000 have run completely counter to all the principles of good governance NEPAD has been trying to foster and to which President Thabo Mbeki has been so personally committed”21

Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe and a member of NEPAD, stood against everything the African Renaissance represented. Western Powers may have taken Mbeki seriously had he applied some form of economic or political pressure on Mugabe. Mugabe had dismissed Mandela and Mbekis African National Congress (ANC) political party in favour of the Pan-African Congress (PAC). Mbeki, however, needed Mugabe to lever opposition members in the PAC as well as provide South Africa with influence in the war in the Congo. Furthermore, at the 1997 ANC party conference it was clear that the ANC wanted to strengthen bonds with liberation parties such as the ZANU-PF22.

Mbeki was also watchful not to support Morgan Tsvangirai whose party MDC largely derives from the trade union movement, such support could elicit support for South Africa’s own trade union movement COSATU on which Mbeki relies as part of the tripartite alliance and supporting Tsvangirai could easily upset the balance of power.

These reasons obliged Mbeki to respect Mugabe and not compel him to follow the spirit of the renaissance. Mbeki thus misrepresents South Africa as a democratic country deterring funding from Tony Blair and President Bush in the process23 and renders NEPAD’s influence and authority worthless. Mbeki would also frustrate Pallo Jordan and his own government who despised his lies to the USA as Mbeki pretended Zimbabwe was democratic and elections could easily take place there24.

Mbeki was also cautious with Mugabe especially considering the amount of Zimbabwean refugees who arrive in South Africa every year. Many of these refugees found employment ahead of South African citizens, which in turn led to violent attacks. The xenophobic attacks of May 2008 produced such disturbing images as that of a man being burnt to death but despite how horrific these attacks were, the continuous repression in Zimbabwe was still worth trying to escape from. Mbeki did not criticise Mugabe or his regime, whereas Jacob Zuma, the leader of the ANC condemned the actions of Mugabe and stated that the xenophobic assaults were not a true reflection of South Africa25. Jacob Zuma succeeded Mbeki as leader of the ANC and as President of South Africa. He is a proud Zulu African surrounded by controversy; the natural inclination is to presume that the African Renaissance can’t continue with Zuma as president.

Conclusion

It is felt that Mbeki may have extended his African roots because he was in exile for so long. On returning to South Africa he felt he needed to prove what Africa meant to him and set about doing so with Mandela’s words “African Renaissance”. Mbeki spearheaded the renaissance ideology but it never materialised therefore to ask if the renaissance will end begs the question; did it ever begin?

The renaissance never existed in a legal form; it was a mere dream capable of releasing interpretations of African identity which can form a weak leadership26 dependent on Western countries. Mbeki sought to unite Africa and he did so with the establishment of AU and NEPAD, however by President Wade’s standards nothing was achieved. Mbeki failed to unite Africa because he was anxious of the consequences for his presidency; an example of this is how his quite diplomacy failed to represent the thousands of Zimbabwean refugees in Africa who were mistreated by Mugabe. Mbeki also failed to help his fellow Africans who could have benefitted from ART. Mbeki’s lack of leadership caused the death of thousands of fellow Africans. Even if an African Renaissance was underway it was certainly over by the xenophobic riots.

Mbeki did want the renaissance to be more then just an ideology, it was a call to unite27 and Africa stood to gain more then South Africa did. South Africa would be the militant power and political think tank but it never transpired. However South Africa was still a divided society in its infancy with a history of providing mercenaries to the highest bidder. Perhaps a more central, traditional state should have led the charge like Mogae or Khama in Botswana, both of whom would take a more hard line approach with Mugabe. Maybe the African Renaissance is already here, with the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The Italian Renaissance did not start with an act or an agreement but it was the convergence of ideas. That said Italy did not have fifty three countries many of whom were at conflict, disproportionate trade agreements, the AIDS pandemic, a brain drain and a neighbour like Mugabe. Mbeki provided ideas not results and his actions failed to deal with the aforementioned inconveniences and so his early departure from the ANC and his presidency are testament to the fence sitting personality he conveyed. Whilst most fear for the future of South Africa and indeed Africa, the future of the intangible African Renaissance will remain bound to words which Zuma may use as a discretionary populist tool to rally international relations.

Referrences as endnotes

[1] Farley, J., 2008, “Southern Africa”, United Kingdom, Published by Routledge, pp. 125

[2] Addison, T., Mavrotas, G., McGillivray, M. 2005, “Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals”, Helsinki, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2005/en_GB/rp2005-09/ , Accessed 11/5/09, pp. 6

[3] Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Pattillo, C., 2004, “Africas Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain Drain as Portfolio Decisions”, Journal of African Economies, Vol. 13, AERC Supplement 2, pp.ii15-ii54, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. ii45

[4] Ndulu, B., 2004, “Human Capital Flight: Stratification,Globalization, and the Challenges to Tertiary Education in Africa” JHEA/RESA Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp. 57–91, Boston, Boston College & Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, pp. 61

[5] Mandela, Nelson, 1994, Address to the Heads of State and Government from the Organization of African Unity at Tunis, 13-15/6/1994, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/sp940613.html

[6] Mbeki, Thabo, 1996, Speech made on behalf of ANC on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of The Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, 8/5/1996. Cape Town. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1996/sp960508.html , Accessed 10/5/09.

[7] Makgetla, N., 2006, “Black Economic Empowerment: politically correct capitalism or social problem?”, Featured in At the end of the rainbow? Social identity and welfare state in the new South Africa, English version of a printed book published in Danish by Southern Africa Contact: For enden af regnbuen? Social identitet og velfærd i det nye Sydafrika, København, november 2006, pp. 76, Accessed 9/5/09 http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/library/getImg.pdf#page=73

[8] Clinton, Bill, 1998, Remarks to the People of Ghana at Independence Square, Accra during his presidency, 23/3/98, Accessed 10/5/09 http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4601

[9] Vale, P., Maseko, S., 1998, ‘South Africa and the African Renaissance’, International Affairs, 74, 2, (1998), pp. 271 – 287, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 282

[10] Reuters article, 2007, “Ethiopia-Eritrea impasse could lead to new war -UN”, 24/12/07, Accessed 12/5/09 http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN24485835

[11] Weiss, H., 2000, “War and peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”
Uppsala, Published by Nordic Africa Institute, pp.5

[12] Meredith, M., 2005,“The State of Africa, A history of fifty years of independence”, London, The Free Press, pp. 684

[13] Ibid pp.685

[14] Watts, S. 2008, “UK fund for S Africa Aids fight” 29/11/2008, Accessed 11/5/09, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7755241.stm

[15] Mingo, C., Wehner, J., 2001, “MAP, OMEGA, and NAI to Nepad: Towards a development blueprint for Africa”, South Africa, Idasa: Budget Information Service, Accessed 12/5/09

[16] NEPAD, No date given, “What is NEPAD”, Accessed 10/5/09, http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php

[17] Nkulhu, W., 2008, NEPAD Online Weekly Newsletter .02, an address by Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, former Chief Executive of NEPAD, delivered at the University of Pretoria, South Africa dated 25/1/08, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.triomedia.co.za/work/nepad/newsletters/2008/issue209_25Jan2008.html

[18] Carrasco, E., McClellan, C., Ro, J., 2007, “Foreign Debt: Forgiveness and Repudiation”, University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part4-I.shtml

[19] Data Cited in Marcela Sanchez, “Breaking Ranks at the World Bank,” Washington Post, 1/2/06

[20] Ba, D., 2007, “Senegal President Slams NEPAD”, 14/6/07, Accessed 11/5/09, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=nw20070613215353419C525099

[21] Farley, J., 2008, “Southern Africa”, United Kingdom, Published by Routledge, pp. 130

[22] Ibid pp.131

[23] Gumede, W., 2005, “Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC”, Cape Town, Published by Zebra, pp194

[24] Gumede, W., 2005, “Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC”, Cape Town, Published by Zebra, pp. 140

[25] Sguazzin, A., Seria, N., 2008, “South Africa’s Zuma, ANC Condemns Zimbabwe Government” Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aMl3HsYbaa9w&refer=africa

[26] Kwame, A., 1992, “In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture”, London, Methuen, pp. 284

[27] Gumede, W., 2005, “Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC”, Cape Town, Published by Zebra, pp. 203

Bibliography

Addison, T., Mavrotas, G., McGillivray, M. 2005, “Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals”, Helsinki, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2005/en_GB/rp2005-09/

ANC Today, Vol 9 No 8, 27 February – 5 March 2009, Accessed 10/5/09
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2009/text/at08.txt

Arieff, I., Reuters article, 2007, “Ethiopia-Eritrea impasse could lead to new war -UN”, 24/12/07, Accessed 12/5/09

http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN24485835
Ba, D., 2007, “Senegal President Slams NEPAD”, 14/6/07, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=nw20070613215353419C525099

Carrasco, E., McClellan, C., Ro, J., 2007, “Foreign Debt:  Forgiveness and Repudiation”, University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part4-I.shtml

Clinton, B., 1998, Remarks to the People of Ghana at Independence Square, Accra during his presidency, 23/3/98, Accessed 10/5/09 http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4601

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Pattillo, C., 2004, “Africas Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain Drain as Portfolio Decisions”, Journal of African Economies, Vol. 13, AERC Supplement 2, pp.ii15-ii54, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Farley, J., 2008, “Southern Africa”, United Kingdom, Published by Routledge.

Gumede, W., 2005, “Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC”, Cape Town, Published by Zebra.

Kwame, A., 1992, “In my father’s house: Africa in the philosophy of culture”, London, Methuen.

Makgetla, N., 2006, “Black Economic Empowerment: politically correct capitalism or social problem?”, Featured in At the end of the rainbow? Social identity and welfare state in the new South Africa, English version of a printed book published in Danish by Southern Africa Contact: For enden af regnbuen? Social identitet og velfærd i det nye Sydafrika, København, november 2006, pp. 76. Accessed 9/5/09

http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/library/getImg.pdf#page=73
Malegapuru W., 1999, “African Renaissance”, Sandton and Cape Town, Mafube and Tafelberg, 1999.

Mandela, N., 1994, Address to the Heads of State and Government from the Organization of African Unity at Tunis, 13-15/6/1994, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/sp940613.html

Mbeki, T., 1996. Speech made on behalf of ANC on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of The Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, 8/5/1996. Cape Town, Accessed 10/5/09
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1996/sp960508.html
Mbeki, T., 1998, “The African Renaissance Statement of Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki”, 13/8/98, SABC, Gallagher Estate, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/tm0813.htm

Meredith, M., 2005, “The State of Africa, A history of fifty years of independence”, London, The Free Press.

Ndulu, B., “Human Capital Flight: Stratification,Globalization, and the Challenges to Tertiary Education in Africa”, JHEA/RESA Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp. 57–91

Mingo, C., Wehner, J., 2001, “MAP, OMEGA, and NAI to Nepad: Towards a development blueprint for Africa”, South Africa, Idasa: Budget Information Service, Accessed 12/5/09
www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=1075

Ndulu, B., 2004, “Human Capital Flight: Stratification,Globalization, and the Challenges to Tertiary Education in Africa” JHEA/RESA Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp. 57–91, Boston, Boston College & Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

NEPAD, No date given, “What is NEPAD”, Accessed 10/5/09, http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php

Nkulhu, W., 2008, NEPAD Online Weekly Newsletter .02, an address by Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, former Chief Executive of NEPAD, delivered at the University of Pretoria, South Africa dated 25/1/08, Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.triomedia.co.za/work/nepad/newsletters/2008/issue209_25Jan2008.html

Sanchez, M., “Breaking Ranks at the World Bank,” Washington Post, 1/2/06

Sguazzin, A., Seria, N., 2008, “South Africa’s Zuma, ANC Condemns Zimbabwe Government” Accessed 11/5/09 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aMl3HsYbaa9w&refer=africa

Vale, P., Maseko, S., 1998, “South Africa and the African Renaissance”, International Affairs, 74, 2, pp. 271-287, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

Venter, A., “I Ching for the ‘African Renaissance’”, Nomadic Exploration Press, Johannesburg, 2006.

Washington, A., Jalango, O., 2002, “The African renaissance: history, significance and strategy”, N.J. and Asmara, Eritrea, Published by Africa World Press, 2002.

Watts, S. 2008, “UK fund for S Africa Aids fight” 29/11/2008, Accessed 11/5/09, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7755241.stm

Weiss, H., 2000, “War and peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”
Uppsala, Published by Nordic Africa Institute.

Weekly Political Paper Review

Each week we would examine an academic paper and hand in an evaluation identifying the following points in words or as visual diagrams.

1. Identifiy the central hypothesis
2. Find the casual mechanism, dependent variables and independent variables
3. How would you operationalize the variables
4. What empirical evidence leads you to believe this paper is true and false
5. Provide a rival explanation

Each paper would then be presented to the class by three students in a presentation with a minimum of fifteen minutes each.

Here are some of the typical weekly articles I reviewed

Why did the poorest countries fail to catch up?

Written by Branko Milanovic

1
The central hypothesis of this paper is that developing countries lack a certain quality which restricts them from catching up with developed countries.

I believe it is a falsifiable proposition because the average educational attainment of the developing countries populations increased during the study, this is long term development and if trends continue the poorest counties could catch in development.

2
The causal mechanism of this paper is that factors like war, reliance on multinational lenders can cause economic development. Democracy and education when combined with peaceful times can cause economic development.

The dependant variable is development.

The independent variables are war, reliance on multinational lenders, rate of reform, democracy and education (in peaceful times)

3
I would operationalize the variables by adding an unknown variable which is string non-democratic states.

4
The empirical evidence that leads me to believe that the proposition is correct is the amount of significance given to the presence of war.

The evidence that leads me to believe the proposition is incorrect is that is that population size and democracy are found to not affect population growth. Considering Ross’s “Is Democracy good for the poor”, there is a vast amount of information lacking from successful non-democratic states like Cuba which ca offset all these statistics. Also population growth can account for some of the success of China (from Gallaghers ‘Reform and Openness’: Why China’s Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy‘ World Politics) and India

5
A rival explanation would be that since Stockholm in 1972 the world has been catapulted more and more into a state of sustainable development. The establishment of the WTO in 1995 ensured that people in developing countries didn’t benefit from trading but the rich traders did.

However I don’t need to take this explanation seriously because IFIs who operate on a similar moral are addressed and found to be a positive in developing states. Although I would still view this as suppression.

The Logic of the Developmental State

by Ziya Öniş
1
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the state is accountable for economic growth.

It is a falsifiable proposition because there are predictable factors outside the control of the state which can influence economic growth, for example religion & terrorism. There are also unpredictable factors like natural disasters & fashion (for luxury goods) which can also influence economic growth. I think the true proposition for economic growth has three roots which are displayed in my diagram.

2
The causal mechanism of this paper is that sole trade liberalization, private enterprise and a restricted role of the state create economic growth.

The dependant variable is economic growth.

The independent variables are sole trade liberalization, private enterprise and a restricted role of the state

3
I would operationalize the variables as Öniş has done. The predictable and unpredictable factors are present in every state and therefore must have a value of zero for this study.

4
The empirical evidence that leads me to believe that the proposition is correct are the four cited examples Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore . How the state of Korea focused on a competitive industrial market place with long term goals in mind. This might seem a risky move, however for long term growth a market place must have competition.

The evidence that leads me to believe the proposition is incorrect is that every development state is different and hence whilst the Asian examples are established facts they can’t be applied across the board as states and cultures are completely different.

5
A rival explanation would be that in the post-Cold War era these countries were under pressure to assert their existence and the governments implemented their plan in an authoritarian manner.

However I don’t need to take this explanation seriously because the public-private cooperation exemplified in this study ensures that geo-political motivations were overruled by development and economic growth.

Does Oil Hinder Democracy

by Michael L. Ross.

1
This paper assumes that the presence of oil can reduce the level of democracy in a state. The central hypothesis of this paper is High levels of oil impact adversely on levels of democracy in a state.

This isn’t a falsifiable proposition, through three different mechanism studies Ross has proved that governments will act less democratic or else their ability to act in the people’s interests will be impeded. However in the Repression effect, Ross does argue that sometimes a state will be required to act in the people’s interest and invest in security to protect the state.

2
The causal mechanism of this paper is

Oil + State = Decline Democracy.

Ross investigates other possible variables such as

1. The Rentier Effect- taxes, government consumption & GDP

2. The Repression Effect- Military GNP, Military personnel, oils, minerals & income

3. The Modernization Effect- low levels of occupational specialization, education, health services, media participation, and urbanization.

However no matter how many different variables Ross uses (which can produce correlations e.g. military GNP) the evidence proves without any need for independent variables in a time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 that once oil in present democracy is reduced.

The dependant variable is a decline in democracy

The independent variable is oil
3
I would operationalize the variables as Ross has, he covered three different theories from variables, mechanisms and regressions. However I would prefer to use Islam as it is today as a variable. Ross uses it as it was in 1970. It is the fastest growing religion in the world and I believe it is far more significant as a variable today. I would also use a more long term model of the variable ethnic tensions. Ross uses an example between 1982 and 1997 which covers the fall of communism. Many ethnic tensions in this period could be attributed to this failed ideology. A more long term variable would give a more honest view. Perhaps using variables as income, GDP & population density (”Greed and grievance in civil war” 2004. Paul Collier.)

4
The empirical evidence that leads me to believe that the proposition is correct is through the study of 113 states over 26 not only has Ross shown the significance of oil in reducing democracy. He also shows how oil can reduce democracy even more in poorer countries. He has also shown that there is evidence to suggest the presence of oil can cause autocracy.

The evidence that leads me to believe the proposition is incorrect is that Ross finds non-fuel minerals and natural resources also reduce democracy. Where oil and non-fuel minerals are present in a state Ross may be over-compensating the effect of oil and not looking at other resources.

5
A rival explanation would be that the presence of Islam reduces the effect of democracy and promotes the misuse of government funds for the protection of oil.

However I don’t need to take this explanation seriously because there are states like Venezuela, Mexico and Cuba (once Castro dies and communism falls apparently) which have a large portion of the worlds oil but do not have a significant presence of Islam.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?

by
Habyarimana et al 2007

1
This paper assumes that ethnic diversity diminishes public goods. The central hypothesis of this paper is that “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” can influence the provision of public goods. This is not a falsifiable proposition however it is very general and a safe study.

2
The causal mechanism of this paper is that Ethnic diversity provides poor public goods to communities due to the individual preferences, technology and strategy selections.

The dependant variables are provision of public goods and ethnic diversity.

The independent variables are preferences, technology and strategy selection

3
I would operationalize the variables exactly as is done in this study. This study is hands on and in direct contact with the subject which is a difficult thing to do in most studies.

4
The empirical evidence that leads me to believe that the proposition is correct is that they have taken the results directly from people being affected by a poor provision of public services. There is nothing to disrupt the study. The work is based on their findings and not the study of others.

The evidence that leads me to believe the proposition is incorrect is that they assume diversity diminishes public goods and also they have approached the factors in a very general way hence the results can lack depth or real insight and therefore provide incorrect data. Also these individuals results can be exaggerate.

5
A rival explanation would be the external factors such as political regime (authoritarian, democratic, communist)

However I favour the explanation of Habyarimana et al because they look at exactly what is the preferences at ground level. They have created factors and collected data to form  a study which required them to rationally dissect a community. Given that people don’t always vote for the political regimes this hands on study can provide more real results.

The causes of corruption: a cross-national study”

2000 by Daniel Treisman.

Q1 The central hypothesis of this paper is that corruption occurs less frequently in democratic states and that there are a number of alternative slow release catalysts which can account for a corrupt state.

Proposition
No Protestant tradition
No Previous British rule
Non-developed economies
+ Low import rates
= Corruption

It is falsifiable because corruption is something that can’t be quantified. It is impossible to measure such a quality because its success usually depends on a high level of discretion. Regardless of the things which can measure the minority of results of corruption, there will always be a majority of results which are “swept under the carpet”.

With so many corrupt acts occurring behind doors and based on secrecy the ability to put an accurate number or statistic on corruption is impossible and can only at best remain pure speculation. Here is my reformulation diagram:

Q.2 The Causal Mechanism is that countries with a history of British rule, protestant traditions, high imports and a developed economy have a lower level of corruption then countries which don’t have these attributes.

The independent variables are a lack of Protestant tradition and Previous British rule, Non-developed economies and low import rates. The dependent variable is corruption.

Q.3 I would operationalize the key independent and dependent variables by introducing two new variables which are “unknown dealings” of corruption which are invisible to the average man. This unquantifiable unknown is often the motivation for corrupt acts.

My second variable is “Poor enforcement” which can be a result of internal bribing, fear stemming from politicians and also poor domestic enforcement training.

I think the consequences resulting from a trade-off of these two new variables would be a reduction in the effect of English rule and Protestantism. Because these variables will affect states across the because they are more domestic problems.

Q.4 The empirical evidence that convinces me that this is incorrect is that at the height of Ireland’s economic boom under Fianna Fail as lead by Bertie Ahern the country had history of previous:

A) British rule -until 1922)
B) High import rate -what was initially FDI
C) A developed economy (what we thought was developed)
D) A protestant tradition- almost every town in Ireland has a protestant church. Church of Ireland was the official religion of the country until 1871

So Ireland had the 4 independent variables for a less corrupt state during the 1990’s, however as we are finding out (through sensationalist T.V. shows and Marathon Tribunals) this was the most corrupt time in Ireland’s history. Hence as mere observers in domestic politics we perhaps see 10% of what happens, relying only on recordable consequences.

In international politics I would imagine that number would be diluted to 1% due to the lack of legal implications, the layers of government officials and departments and the lack of media access to provide information to people on ground level.

Also the variable of openness to trade causes only a slight effect rendering it almost insignificant in real terms.

The empirical evidence that convinces me that this paper is correct is that Protestantism and British rule are important variables. They provide a counter culture and form communities.

Q.5 A rival explanation would be that common law is the only difference in these societies. Countries practising common law imposes well established penalties to corruption. Therefore any potential corruption which may possibly occur in a state practising common law may be discouraged by the pending consequences.

Valerie Bockstette in her paper “States and Markets: The advantage of an early start” proves the ability of the common law system to discourage corruption when compared with countries who use the French law system.

I don’t have to take this rival explanation seriously because although common law may exist in a country it needs to be enforced. Common Law was created in Britain and was designed for use in Britain. The further it travels from Europe the more diluted it becomes. Precedent won’t matter if the law is not being enforced correctly. This enforcement may not be applied for reasons such as bribes or fear.

Is Democracy Good for the Poor?

by Micheal Ross

1
The central hypothesis of this paper is that democracy helps the upper echelons of society and not the poor whereas non-democracies disperse wealth more evenly in society. It’s a falsifiable statement because the evidence points to democracies dispersing the wealth better then non-democracies however the evidence is not all available for strong non-democracies like Cuba. The proposition should read “Democracies dispense their wealth better amongst the different classes then non-democracies do, based on a limited amount of evidence which neglects the strongest performing non-democratic states”.
This proposition is definitely inaccurate and probably wrong as evidence from strong performing non-democratic states is missing.
 

Democracy

Non-democracy
Strong
Weak

Data

Data

NO Data

Data

2
The causal mechanism of this paper is that the infant and child mortality rate will be higher in democracies then in non-democracies.
The dependant variables are the log of child mortality rate and the log of infant mortality rate.
The independent variables are Polity IV database which measures 0-10 (21 point scale) for democracies and authoritarianisms for each country- year, population, income, infant and child mortality, which Ross believes is higher when there is a low rate of clean water, sanitation, indoor air quality, female education, literacy, prenatal and neonatal health services, calorific intake, disease and income.

3
I would operationalize the variables by removing the controlled variable of growth. Although Dollar and Kray find it benefits the poor I believe it can broaden the gap between rich and poor. The type of economic growth is important because if it is a growth in natural resources then the poor of a state should benefit. However if growth is due to outsourcing by a foreign company who relocate a workforce there then the poor may not necessarily benefit.
 
4
The empirical evidence that leads me to believe that the proposition is correct is that if child and infant mortality include can provide evidence for the variables such as: rate of clean water, sanitation, indoor air quality, female education, literacy, prenatal and neonatal health services, calorific intake, disease and income; then I believe almost all indicators of poverty are included.
The evidence that leads me to believe that this paper is wrong is that exogenous global health trends between 1970 and 2000 doesn’t account for the spread of low cost health interventions, this can wrongly attribute numbers in favour of the growing trend of democracy during that period. Also studies of democracies and the poor don’t account for country specific effects. 

5
A rival explanation would be that poor people in democracies receive an equal amount of public health benefits as poor people in non-democracies. However due to the absence of non-democracies information we can’t verify this. Poverty is different in every country and even every town/village. Any attempt to measure this by political means can only provide more questions. Ross cites an example about child mortality rates in India which proves how even within one state different outcomes give inaccurate findings.
However, I favour Ross’s explanation as there is more evidence to prove that poor people in democracies do receive more public health benefits and enjoy more political rights. However, it must be added that people in the bottom quintile experience few if no benefits and with limited information we can only overestimate democracies abilities.

Greed and grievance in civil war

2004 by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler.

The central hypothesis of this paper establishes the causes of civil war. The causal proposition tests two theories: one is that grievances in the form of inequality, political rights & ethnic/religious divisions can cause civil war. The second is that civil wars are created by greed, manifested by presented opportunities. Although neither of the two theories are incorrect or inaccurate the impact of economic opportunity is paramount to this study when primary commodity exports are considered, especially oil. When exports account for up to 33% of national GDP a country has a 22% chance of civil war. The study also predicts, from regressions, the probability of a war breaking out.
 
Q2
In this paper, the chances of civil war occurring is calculated by the following factors:
Low income per capita (t)(i) +high ratio primary commodity exports/GDP (t)(i) + dispersed population (t)(i) = civil war
t = time
i = country
The amount of time has a big influence on the probability of war. The longer a country is not in a state of civil war, the less likely it is to have another civil war. Stereotypical civil war Variables such as political rights, inequality and a social heterogeneous structure with respect to religion or ethnicity play less of a role then one would assume.

Q3
I believe civil war does rely on low income per capita, primary exports and a dispersed population. I think this study is very insightful into commonalities involved in civil war. However, I believe a study can’t measure the real human factors for civil war. Beyond grievances and opportunities I think there is a social pressure in certain cultures to be involved in a civil war or support it. There is a peer and family pressure in civil war which is not accounted for in this study.
Civil war does not only affect the people involved but their families and societies. Hence the different supporting roles played by each society member must be analysed. This is neither grievance, opportunity nor social cohesion but facilitation.  When civil war becomes a norm some people may not support the cause or the war but they support those involved and this is a defined role which can’t be measured.
 

Q4
The fact that both grievance and opportunity are causes of civil war leads me to believe the proposition is correct. Although the importance of opportunity outweighs grievance, the fact that income per capita and heterogeneity of population are both grievances indicates that both theories can explain civil war. Also diasporas can play a large part in a rebellion and encouraging and supporting people with their money which is fuelled by grievance.
In looking at the data analysed, there are inconsistencies such as the fact that the only diasporas analysed in the study are located in America. People that relocate throughout the world will not be measured in this study. Similarly, second generation diasporas who support a civil war in their parents country of origin will not be accounted for.
The definition of civil war as being “internal conflict with 1000+ combat deaths per year” will distinguish the study from massacres, however in the eyes of the nationals a massacres may be the catalyst of a civil war which later ensued. 
Also, in the study if one war ended and another one started in the same period these events are coded as one. These wars could be two separate issues, however they are counted as one in the case of the logit regression analysis. Also ongoing wars are coded as missing observations however I think they should be given a value of one as they are civil wars and even if they end peacefully they have achieved civil war status.
The measured effect of the cold war is not as significant as I would have thought in this paper which leads me to believe there are inaccuracies in the study. Also the fact that in the initial study changes in income only count where there is more then one civil war, they then had to re-estimate excluding repeat wars which reduces the evidence between wars, hence this data does not give an accurate measure of income levels between wars.

Q5
Hirshleifer (1995,2001) introduces “perceptions” which can allow for misjudging opportunities. Hence if civil war is unprofitable it will collapse, however as we conclude in this study there are both for-profit and not-for-profit rebel organisations. Although growth was examined in the model, I believe more specifically technology can be a factor in civil war. Older generations and traditional tribes do not always welcome change and this can cause conflict. A move from agriculture to industry can upset people into rebelling as it can threaten not only a livelihood but a culture. On the other side of the spectrum some people want change and will stop at nothing to attain and hence.

Of all types of conflict civil war is the most difficult to define or justify. The word holds an infinite ambiguity. Reasons for each civil war are as different as the countries they occur in and so I believe any theory or preposition can only apply to a minority of countries.

When should we stop giving ?

“Investment is necessary but not sufficient”
William Easterly[1](2006:39)

Post World War II saw a move to independence for many African States. However much of their success was funded by Non-African money and managed by corrupt politicians. Africa tended toward an authoritarian regime in a move away from western democracy ideals and by the 1980’s many Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) countries were in a state of emergency. Neo-colonialism soon began whereby donor states would reap benefits without doing the “maintenance work”. Insincere contributions created a dependence on foreign aid and disingenuous organisations ensured that the world order would remain the same for future generations.

I have chosen to examine the affects of foreign aid in the form of sustainable development and its impact on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). I will inspect the efforts of the World Bank (WB) and The International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as The United Nations (UN) in SSA. I will then concentrate on the states of Malawi and Tanzania. I have chosen these countries because agriculture comprises at least 32% of GDP in both states and accounts for as much as 85% of exports in both countries[2]. Both countries share similar legal systems, achieved independence in 1964 and have held multi-party elections since 1994 and 1995 respectively. They both embarked on structural adjustment during the 1980’s, applied for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) in the 1990’s and they also have Millennium Development Goals (MDG) to attain by 2015.

International Organisations

As Africa entered the 1980’s it comprised of multiple failed states entering a state of emergency, the state propelled socialist policies that swept the continent had failed. The governments unsuccessful supervision of debt and tax coupled with sub-standard management approaches at institutions forced many SSA countries to turn to western states for help, the very ones they struggled to be free of. African governments were responsible and although everyone could admit it, change is often difficult to implement. A transition was required to transform countries from state run institutions to transparent enterprises with the ability to compete as a market. To achieve this, countries required a reform which would allow for the privatisation of public bodies. This transition was called “Structural Adjustment”.

In 1986 concessional finance was made available from the IMF to SSA’s poorest countries through the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). This became the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987 and in 1993 it was made a permanent facility. Funding was provided when Special Drawing Rights (SDR) were met and between March 1986 and December 1995, SDR of US$2.4 billion was distributed. A state could borrow 140% of its IMF quota under a three year arrangement. The annual interest rate was .5% and the nine repayments were to be twice a year starting from 5.5 years after receipt of money[3]. This money was available to countries so that they could implement a plan which would attract foreign investors and they would hence relax their borders and constraints thereby participating in open markets.

“Debt is an efficient tool. It ensures access to other peoples’ raw materials and infrastructure on the cheapest possible terms[4]”.Susan George (1990:143). This creation of a world market creates an automatic hierarchy. SSA’s poorest countries are indebted to the richest countries with unrealistic payments on unimaginable debts. These countries are then exposed for their natural resources and obliged to trade these commodities for free. Subsequent to this, local markets in these developing countries experienced a deluge of competition from foreign market goods in the form of textiles and agricultural produce. These products are produced in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries as subsidised products. Therefore these competitive products can afford to monopolise local markets in developing countries because they will have the lowest price in a market with no regulation[5].

However whilst people criticise the efforts of such agencies it’s easily done and alternative solutions prove difficult to find. The fact remains: there is a need for foreign intervention in Africa. Bockstette et al (2002:362)[6] conclude that effective government is an asset for economic growth. African politicians are corrupt and they don’t have the institutional experience to govern a sovereign state, the exception of this is Botswana. Regardless of Transparency International rating Botswana the least corrupt country in Africa,[7] it is not without its corruption. As former President Mogae[8] and current President Khama[9] have both supported the ousting of the world’s oldest tribe: the San from their Kalahari Reservation to purpose built towns where San people are subject to new diseases and bribed with water and food. The reason for this expulsion of a culture was to create infrastructure to mine for diamonds.

The HIPC was established in 1996 by the IMF and WB with the aim of “ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage”[10]. Once considered for HIPC status the international community will decide if a country is to be granted a reduction in debt to a sustainable level. In order to receive full relief available a country must establish a good performance under IMF supported programmes and also agree to certain reforms. These reforms cede power of an economy to private enterprises as they must adhere to guidelines and according to economist Jack Jones Zulu (2003:2) this budget burst will result in mis-management of inflation, exchange rate and interest rates producing a “recipe for failure”[11]. The IMF and WB justified their contributions by stating that they would help achieve the UN’s MDG’s and in 2005 the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was created. This would offer 100% “bailouts” for countries trying to complete the HIPC Initiative process. It seems that Africa has received a multitude of funding and that, with few exceptions; it has failed to prosper accordingly. But there have been large inconsistencies in development aid. Official Development Aid (ODA) had steadily increased to SSA since 1973 as the Cold War progressed. Then SSA experienced what Martin Meredith refers to as “The Lost Decade”[12](2006:368) in the 1980’s as it was ravaged by a food, water and AIDS crisis combined. This attracted a lot of development aid to SSA. However this proved to be short lived as ODA dropped from US$17.3 billion in 1990 to US$1.6 billion in 1999 for SSA which many critics attest to the end of the Cold War, a reduced need for geo-political strategic aid (2004 : 410)[13] and a blind estimates regarding the future political regime of states. . SSA could pit the West against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but now that had changed so once again the power was returned to the West. The reduction of aid and funding in the 1990’s created a lack of infrastructure in SSA which could attract foreign investors. The MDGs include to eradicate poverty, universal primary education, promote gender equality status, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV, AIDS and Malaria, ensure environmental sustainability and most important for the UN to develop a global partnership for development[14].

Addison et al found that SSA is performing the worst of all MDG recipients and at the current rate the goals (which are scheduled to be met by 2015) won’t be complete until 2147. The aim is to halve poverty levels in Africa between 1990 and 2015; this would require aid at US$120 billion by 2015.[15] These unrealistic goals will only prove that SSA will fail again. States may be improving but unrealistic aid levels will ensure that even if aid is delivered it will be too late to implement to changes required to achieve the MDGs. The UN must acknowledge this failure and strive to make a “better plan” next time. However their burden is shared by the people of all SSA recipient countries who must concede another failure. Although Jeffrey Sachs identifies steps that must be taken to achieve the MDGs namely a 51% (US$38 billion) increase in funding from the United States (2005:302)[16] which is was unlikely at that time and now impossible with the world recession. Easterly (2007:4-6)[17] believes the MDGs were intentionally callous to SSA. He predicts the failure of the MDGs citing two reasons: the backdated benchmark of 1990 was started SSA several steps behind its deserved position in 2000. Also Africa has a low poverty elasticity (as measured by the Bells Curve), this is due to it’s low per capita income and means that growth will needed to be at 7% between 2000 and 2005 to be on course for the 2015 MDGs, which it was not.

Other times of fluctuating donor contributions include 9/11, the Tsunami of 2004 but most importantly when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and helped them achieve the necessary HIPC regulations so Iraq could benefit from 100% debt forgiveness. The advantage for the United States was an open invitation to Iraq’s economy, resources and market under the “Bremer Laws” as Iraq was accepted by the HIPC in 2004.[18] This removed much needed funding which would have gone to SSA’s MDGs.

When assessing the efforts of the UN, WB and IMF it’s easy to criticise, still they do induce countries to donate money to developing states. Addison et al (2005:1)[19] find that aid causes growth and therefore a lack of aid causes a lack of growth. The motivations used to stimulate funding are unethical. On the recipient side there is much corruption in SSA’s states which allows money to be mismanaged and misdirected. Both dishonest donors and recipients can benefit from aid but the people worse affected by the transfer of money are the millions living in SSA who see international organisations ask too much and domestic politicians take too much. We should stop giving to corruption but it doesn’t affect our day to day life and so it is hard to see change as necessary.

Tanzania and International Organisations

Tanzania under President Nyerere applied its own structural adjustment plans such as the National Economic Survival Plan 1981 and the Structural Adjustment Programme 1983: these soon saw the state become the second poorest country in the world in terms of GDP per capita. These plans were not enforced correctly due to a lack of funding causing the relocation of millions of people[20](Reed:107:127) as well as two third of Tanzania’s food crops being sold through unofficial markets (2006:369)[21]. Tanzania also experienced a 94% decline in Civil Service wages between 1969 and 1985[22]. President Nyerere refused Structural Adjustment as provided by the IMF and WB until his retirement in 1985. At which stage the country became instantly inundated with donations: total United States foreign aid in 1985 US$352.5 million[23]. Nyereres 1967 Arusha Declaration of Socialist action was discarded and the people of Tanzania embraced foreign aid. The impact of structural development in Tanzania was an immediate success.

The Agricultural Adjustment Program was introduced by the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) – an amalgamation of the Tanzanian Government and the WB in 1986. In 1987 Tanzania obtained a US$67.9 million SDR from the IMF supporting the ERP. The task of the ERP was to increase exports, rehabilitate infrastructure and increase industrial capacity. Market control on food crops were abolished in 1989, between 1990 and 1994 all producer prices for main agricultural products were removed. The pricing on an export list initially containing of 400 products including coffee, tobacco, cashew nuts and cotton was reduced to two products with price control: petroleum and electricity. Subsidies which were at 80% for important tools such as fertilizer were gradually removed by 1995[24] (2001:11-17). Further to the ERP in 1989 a five year development plan was created by Economic and Social Action Programme (ESAP) the aims of which were to reduce state control and to endorse the private enterprise.

Aili Mari Tripp (1997:105,199,200) accredits two factors for this: that women were running microenterprises from their houses which were supporting families, secondly the rise of associational life such as Upato savings societies and Sungu Sungu self defence group adds value to societies and encourage both unity and independence[25] This small trade environment enabled the people to control their own wage and market. The priority was to improve transport out in and out of the country for the ever in anticipation of the export market boom. Progress was made between 1986 and 1989 and GDP increased to 4% per year, however between 1990 and 1995 a lower dedication to reforms from the Tanzanian government caused a GDP to decline and instability which in turn restricted the money the IMF and WB donated. Total exports shrunk from US$643.1 million in 1989 to US$353.4 million in 1992[26] (2001:12).

Under Mwinyi’s double term presidency Tanzania experienced soaring heights before the 1990’s when good reforms were neglected and the country’s plummeted. In 1995 Mkapa became president of Tanzania and secured the fiscal support of the international community by promising to seek sound economic reforms. The ERP was rejuvenated with priorities beyond economic development such as education and health to the forefront of the agenda. Key to reform was a VAT system which was introduced in 1995 which is a system not many African states apply or recognise. Inflation was 7%; the lowest in twenty years. However by 1998 Tanzania was indebted to the WB US$575 million for twenty six failed agriculture projects, WB Operations and Evaluation Department confessed they didn’t collaborate with the local knowledge of Tanzanian people. The IMF, content with Tanzania’s efforts considered them for HIPC status in 1999 this would cancel their debt, but at a price. There were seventy eight conditions including breaking-up the national electricity system, a redirecting of credit away from development projects and a removal of restrictions on imports and exports. From this moment on the IMF owned Tanzania. They could export all national resources whilst flooding local markets with subsidised goods from the west. Health and education, which was traditionally high in Tanzania, dropped to levels not seen before[27].

At the UN Headquarters in September 1990 the Millennium Summit produced eight Millennium Goals to be attained by 2015. According to the UN[28] there are twenty three requirements to attain the eight goals, Tanzania has achieved two of these, seven of these are on track to be achieved and seven of these requirements need attention. The UN state that Tanzania is on track to complete it’s goals, however it is not on track to eradicate poverty by reducing the number of people living below the poverty line. Also the health system is not on course as under five infant mortality (as a cause of malnutrition) needs to be half of what it was in 2004 and maternal mortality rates have increased between 1990 and 2005. Although AIDS/HIV rates almost doubled between 1990 and 2000 they are now on track to be achieved, Annika Janson[29] believes that the goals could have been achieved if there were more motivated and skilled health professionals available. The UN’s concerns are that the agriculture sector has underperformed with little investment and the majority of primary exports leave the country unprocessed. These sub-standard exports devalue the commodity as the importer incurs processing cost. Hence Tanzania is at the mercy of the worlds markets and is under threat from competitors. This pressure is of great concern to the UN[30] and even more so to the people of Tanzania who despite a large improvement in education, they rely on agriculture for 40% of GDP, 85% of exports and it employs 80% of the workforce[31].

Malawi and International Organisations

Malawi under Hastings Kamuzu Banda from 1961-1993 was similar to Tanzania in many respects as highlighted in my introduction, however Malawi was aligned with the West during the Cold War and supported the apartheid regime in South Africa. Malawi is also landlocked and suffered a further blow to a diminishing agricultural economy when it’s main route of exporting: the Beira Route, was closed due to civil war in Mozambique. Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries on in the world relying heavily on farming which depends on the wet season. Of the farming population 70% rely on an average of .6 of an acre to farm and survive. With such small holdings and such a risky variable Malawi farmers can’t afford to diversify anything beyond maize[32]. In 1981 Malawi implemented Structural Adjustment, the object of which was to move the state away from traditional agriculture and diversify, possibly by industrialising as well as devaluing the currency, dropping interest rates, breaking up prices, monopolies and privatising government bodies. Before this, Malawi was based on a system of import substitution. The first phase of structural adjustment from 1981-1986 was focused on breaking up state agencies and price restrictions and also promoting private enterprise. However rising civil war in Mozambique meant an influx of refugees and increased transport costs pushed the current account deficit from 7% of GDP in 1985 to 13% of GDP in 1986. During this period trade taxes were increased and restrictions were placed on competitive imports. This was the opposite of what structural adjustment required.

The second phase from 1987 -1994 saw certain tariffs on imports reduced from 130% to 45% and markets began to open up and the majority of industries were becoming more industrialised. After devaluing the Malawian Kwacha during the 1980’s, the government decided on the flotation of the Kwacha in 1994 which lead to it depreciating by 300%.

Whilst some progress was made Malawi was dependent on Maize as a primary export and staple diet, due to the ineffective supervision of the agriculture department. Increased land tax on estates was too small to make a difference and plans for fertilizer subsidies never met their promise despite a loan of US$5 million. The impact of the civil war in Mozambique forced transportation of exports and the collection of imports (fertilizers) in South Africa at higher rates. The cost of fuel charges was also incurred by the farmers of Malawi; this was a significant cost due to the oil crisis of 1979, the government managed to delay the removal of subsidies [33](1997:67,147). There was mass distribution of the crop: hybrid maize coupled with fertilizer at subsidised interest rates to smallholders.

Maize plantations amongst smallholders increased from 8% in 1985 to 25% in 1992. Unfortunately there was a severe drought in 1992 and 1994 which lead to the disintegration of the Smallholder Agriculture Credit Association parastatal in 1994.[34] A bad implementation of structural adjustment allowed Malawi’s food and beverage manufacturing to drop almost 14.5% between 1980 and 1999. The move from import substitution to export orientation under structural adjustment had a negative impact as did joining Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and a bilateral trade agreement with South Africa, which removed any African income from exports. The difficulty for Malawi is developing a manufacturing sector, which is essential for economic growth, when the IMF structural adjustment won’t allow any regulations in the domestic market or import/export market. Given Malawi’s landlocked location surrounded by countries that also produce maize and tobacco, industrialisation and manufacturing is therefore essential to growth.[35]

However tobacco did manage to rise from 54% in the 1980s to 68.7% in 1994 in export earnings but this was at the cost of numerous other industries (1999:16)[36]. Despite the efforts to diversify the economy under structural adjustment agriculture accounted for 40% of the economy which is a 15% increase from 1994[37]. The IMF cites Malawi’s underpriced exports and a fall in interest rates as the main reason that the countries economy declined. [38]President Banda was defeated in the first democratic election in 1994 and succeeded by President Muluzi who spent two five year terms in office. In 1999 Malawi qualified membership in the HIPC as long as it satisfied all the terms of ceding its markets, resources, prices, imports, exports, government and total infrastructure to the IMF. In 2000 a three year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) was approved for Malawi by the IMF. By November 2001 Malawi was off target, the IMF then donated US$9.2 million but by 2004 Malawi was once again off target[39]. Prior to the 2004 elections President Muluzi tried to amend the constitution so that he could spend a third term in office but was defeated by the current President Mutharika. There was a political deadlock as his minority party, the Democratic Progressive Party, is unable to get support to pass bills and corruption has been on the increase. Mutharika launched a war on corruption trying to impeach Muluzi for the unaccountable millions of dollars in foreign aid.[40] Malawi’s external debt was US$894 million by 31st December 2007[41]

Malawi looks set to achieve a majority of its MDGs, reducing maternal death rate and gender equality are unlikely to be met but most of the other goals are on track according to 2008’s UN report. There has been a reduction of the “ultra-poor” from 24% in 1998 to 15% in 2007[42].

Conclusion

There is no doubt that institutional antiquity paves a smooth road for future polit/h2ics. SSA lacks this experience and hence states experience problems governing their states. Nyerere is an example of an SSA politician with strong ideas but without the right direction and he mismanaged his presidency affecting Tanzania’s economy for decades. International Organisations such as the UN, WB and IMF comprise collectively of thousands of years of institutional experience. They combine the most experience evolving antiquity on the planet. However they can still make basic mistakes in governing such as not collaborating with local farmers in Tanzania which resulted in 26 failed agricultural projects in 1999. Similarly the IMF donated US$9.2 million PRGF to a three year project in Malawi that failed after its first year.

When analysing International Organisation like the UN, WB and IMF it’s clear that there is a level of corruption present. Whilst aid does create development it also serves a purpose as an investment for the future. That future can be a safe loan with a low interest rate worth millions of dollars. Alternatively it can be an accession to a structural adjustment or HIPC scheme whereby an entire economy is opened up to OECD countries: exports are worth nothing, especially as your neighbours are producing the same product and in the same vein local markets are subject to highly competitive subsidised imports which reduce the value of domestic produce. Also the UN has set MDGs and no country in SSA will achieve these goals. As a result SSA will require more funding and sacrifice more trading rights in an attempt to attain these impossible goals.

Corruption is the culprit according to Sachs (2005:311).[43] Developing countries possess a large quantity of corruption; Muluzi of Malawi had clearly a part to play in the demise of his country in the late 1990’s. The idea of President Nyerere of Tanzania being corrupt is the subject of much political debate, however the regime he created, that dragged Tanzania into economical turmoil, was fuelled by a corrupt cabinet is a widely acknowledged fact. Even when looking at the economical development example of Botswana we can see both President Mogae and President Khana displaced their oldest ancestors in the interests of diamonds. Meredith (2006:686) states “The core of the crisis is the failure of African leaders to provide effective government” Meredith. (2006: 686)[44]. There are two subjects and one object in the development aid conundrum. The subjects are the international organisations and SSA politicians who benefit and the object is the people of SSA who die in their thousands every day due to poverty, disease and adverse climate changes. However on micro level these players can be very influential as Aili Mari Tripp demonstrated with the women of Tanzania, this is the extent of their involvement in what really is a game for two.

This game for has an order and that should always remain the same. William Easterly refers to Max Escher’s famous print Ascending and Descending which depicts people walking up and down staircases in every direction but in the end they end up in the same spot (2002:110)[45].

International Organisations and SSA states are similar because neither are impervious to corruption or an inability to govern. Tanzania and Malawi both received millions in development aid and loans; took the opportunities and paid the price. However they both have a limited choice as there is what Easterly refers to as centralized corruption, decentralized corruption (2002:247) as well as international corruption in SSA. We should start giving when there is pure transparency internationally and domestically in SSA as well as achievable goals in place.

Bibliography

Addison et al. 2005. “Aid, debt relief and new sources of finance for meeting the Millennium Development Goals” Page 9 UN WIDER Research Paper No. 2005/09 March 2005.

Alwang, Jeffrey. 1999. “Labor Shortages on Small Landholdings in Malawi:Implications for Policy Reforms” World Development Vol.27 No.8 page 1461-1475.
Bandow, Doug. 1999 “The Death of Foreign Aid” Cato Institute. Article originally appeared in the Korea Herald on October 21, 1999. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4959

Bockstette et al. 2002. “States and Markets: The Advantage of an early start” Journal of Economic Growth 7 347-369. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Chirwa, Ephraim 1999. “Structural Adjustment Programs and the Labour Market in Malawi” Working Paper No.WC/06/99, University of Malawi.

Chirwa, Ephraim. 2002. “Trade Policy and Industrialisation in Malawi: The Need for a Strategic Approach” Chancellor of University of Malawi. Wadonda Consult Working Paper WC/02/02.

Dalitso, Kingsley Kubalasa. 2004, “PRSPS, a Positive Development from the Debt Cancellation Campaign?- Malawi’s perspective ‘Under the Microscope’” Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN),

Dunning, Thad 2004. “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa ” International Organization 58, Spring 2004, pp+ 409–423 Published by the IO Foundation.

Easterly, William. 2007. “How the Millennium Development Goals are unfair to Africa” Brookings Global Economy & Development Working Paper 14, November 2007.

Easterly, William. 2006. “The Elusive Quest for Growth” MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.

Engel, Ulf. Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2005. “The African Exception” Ashgate Publishing
George, Susan 1990 “A Fate Worse Than Debt” New York: Grove Weidenfeld.

Hanlon, Joseph. Pettirfor, Anne. 2000. ”Kicking the Habit -Finding a lasting solution to addictive lending and borrowing – and its corrupting side-effects” Jubilee 2000 available http://www.jubileeresearch.org/analysis/reports/habitfull.htm

Jones Zulu, Jack. 2003. “Leaning against Economic Winds: Zambia’s problems with HIPC” Policy Analyst Jubliee-Zambia.

Meerman, Jacob. 1997. “Reforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to Market” World Bank Operations Evaluation Dept. Published by World Bank Publications.

Meredith, Martin 2006. “The State of Africa- a history of fifty years of independence” Free Press Publishing.

Reed, David. 1996. “Under what conditions will ’sensible’ economic policies have unintended social, economic, and environmental consequences?” “Case Study for Tanzania” Structural Adjustment, the Environment and Sustainable Development (London: Earthscan, 1996):107 – 127.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005. “The End of Poverty- how we can make it happen in our lifetime” Published by Penguin Books.
Tripp, Aili Mari. 1997.”Changing The Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania” Aili Mari Tripp. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wobst, Peter. 2001. “Structural Adjustment and Intersectoral Shifts in Tanzania: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis” International Food Policy Research Institute. Published by Int. Food Policy Res Inst IFPRI.

Zeller, Diagne and Mataya. 1997. “Market access by smallholder farmers in Malawi:Implications for technology adoption, agricultural productivity and crop income FCND Discussion Paper No. 35.

Endnotes

[1] Easterly , William. 2006. “The Elusive Quest for Growth” MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.

[2] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mi.html

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html
[3] http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/esaf.htm

[4] George, Susan. 1990. “A Fate Worse Than Debt” New York: Grove Weidenfeld.

[5] http://www.bigpicture.tv/videos/watch/0777d5c17
[6] Bockstette et al 2002 “States and Markets: The Advantage of an early start” Journal of Economic Growth 7 347-369. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

[7] www.transparency.org/content/download/28010/422211/file/NIS_Botswana_report_2007.pdf

[8] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3865403.stm

[9] http://www.survival-international.org/news/4017

[10] http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm

[11] Jones Zulu, Jack. 2003. “Leaning against Economic Winds: Zambia’s problems with HIPC” Policy Analyst, Jubliee-Zambia.
[12] Meredith, Martin. 2006. “The State of Africa – A history of fifty years of independence” Free Press Publishing.

[13] Dunning, Thad. 2004. “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa”International Organization 58, Spring 2004, pp+ 409–423 Published by the IO Foundation.

[14] http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

[15] Addison et al. 2005. “Aid, debt relief and new sources of finance for meeting the Millennium Development Goals” Page 9 UN WIDER Research Paper No. 2005/09 March 2005.

[16] Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005. “The End of Poverty- how we can make it happen in our lifetime” Published by Penguin Books.

[17] Easterly, William. 2007. “How the Millennium Development Goals are unfair to Africa” Brookings Global Economy & Development Working Paper 14, November 2007.
[18] http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/reconstruct/2004/1219uscancelled.htm

[19] Addison et al. 2005. “Aid, debt relief and new sources of finance for meeting the Millennium Development Goals” Page 9 UN WIDER Research Paper No. 2005/09 March 2005.

[20] Reed, David. 1996. “Under what conditions will ’sensible’ economic policies have unintended social, economic, and environmental consequences?” “Case Study for Tanzania” Structural Adjustment, the Environment and Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan.

[21] Meredith, Martin. 2006. “The State of Africa- a history of fifty years of independence” Free Press Publishing.

[22] Engel, Ulf. Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2005. “The African Exception” Ashgate Publishing.
[23] Bandow, Doug. 1999. “The Death of Foreign Aid” Cato Institute. Article originally appeared in the Korea Herald on October 21, 1999. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4959

[24] Wobst, Peter. 2001.“Structural Adjustment and Intersectoral Shifts in Tanzania: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis” International Food Policy Research Institute. Published by Int. Food Policy Res Inst IFPRI.

[25] Tripp, Aili Mari .1997. ”Changing The Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania” Aili Mari Tripp. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

[26] Wobst, Peter. 2001. “Structural Adjustment and Intersectoral Shifts in Tanzania: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis” Peter Wobst, International Food Policy Research Institute. Published by Int. Food Policy Res Inst IFPRI.

[27] Hanlon, Joseph. Pettirfor, Anne. 2000. ”Kicking the Habit -Finding a lasting solution to addictive lending and borrowing – and its corrupting side-effects” Jubilee 2000 available http://www.jubileeresearch.org/analysis/reports/habitfull.htm

[28] http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs_progress.html

[29] Janson, Annika. 2007. “Shed some light on darkness: will Tanzania reach the Millennium
Development Goals?” Scientific Co-Coordinator 2007 an article for Viewpoint available http://nsdl.org/resource/2200/20080825171237434T

[30] http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs_goal1.html

[31] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html

[32] Alwang, Jeffrey. 1999. “Labor Shortages on Small Landholdings in Malawi:Implications for Policy Reforms” Jeffrey Alwang World Development Vol.27 No.8 page 1461-1475.

[33] Meerman, Jacob. 1997. “Reforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to Market” World Bank Operations Evaluation Dept. Published by World Bank Publications.

[34] ”Zeller, Diagne and Mataya. 1997. “Market access by smallholder farmers in Malawi:Implications for technology adoption, agricultural productivity and crop income FCND Discussion Paper No. 35.

[35] Chirwa, Ephraim. 2002. “Trade Policy and Industrialisation in Malawi: The Need for a Strategic Approach” Chancellor of University of Malawi. Wadonda Consult Working Paper WC/02/02

[36] Chirwa, Ephraim. 1999. “Structural Adjustment Programs and the Labour Market in Malawi” Working Paper No.WC/06/99, University of Malawi.

[37] Dalitso, Kingsley Kubalasa. 2004. “PRSPS, a Positive Development from the Debt Cancellation Campaign?- Malawi’s perspective ‘Under the Microscope’” Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN)

[38] http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr06187.htm

[39] http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/06/09132146/21474

[40] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4354656.stm

[41] http://www.unohrlls.org/en/orphan/103/
[42] http://www.undp.org.mw/index.php?option=com_democratic&view=Millennium%20Development%20Goals&Itemid=13&58930effcf1f629ed28c9ca6846cfdcd=5cce7b5498fbf6b7c7674065043e9831

[43] Sachs, Jeffrey 2005. “The End of Poverty-How can we make it happen in our life time” Penguin Books.
[44] Meredith, Martin. 2006. “The State of Africa – A history of fifty years of independence”. Free Press.

[45] Easterly, William. 2002. “The Elusive Quest for Growth” MIT Press Cambridge Massachusetts London, England.

In this section there are essays on Katanga and why Ireland was so involved in the Congo Crisis in the nineteen sixties – ‘Why was Ireland involved in the Congo Crisis ‘.

There is also a reaction to a paper by Eilis Ward on how Ireland handled Hungarian refugees in the nineeteen fifties – ‘A big show-off to show what we could do’.

Article Review: “A big show-off to show what we could do” – Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956.”

Author: Eilis Ward

Source: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7 (1996), pp.131-141. Published by: Royal Irish Academy.

This paper provides an excellent insight into Ireland’s policies regarding Refugees as it has evolved from British Rule through independence and as part of the United Nations (UN). The three sections which analyse these periods are the policies before the Hungarian Refugee Crisis, the Hungarian Refugee Crisis and a policy analysis.

The Irish Free State applied British Law on Refugees with the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 (amended 1919). It appears this act was created to keep Irish nationals out of The United Kingdom (UK). In 1935 The Aliens Act (amended 1946) recognised refugees as it split people into citizens and aliens. Ireland joined the UN in 1955 and assumed the Geneva Convention on Refugees. This obliged Ireland to recognise the right to claim asylum but preserved the right to refuse it too.

Ward (1996:132) identifies two factors which made Ireland unpopular among asylum seekers; Ireland was geographically isolated from mainland Europe, also Ireland would not contribute to refugee resettlement. Ottonello found the latter was present in Dublin’s Italian community during World War II (WWII) as the Jewish Community was compared to rodents (Ottonello:3)[1].

Ward neglects to recognise other possibilities which may have influenced Ireland’s treatment of the Hungarian Refugees. Ireland was in a very poor economic position as it joined the UN, Bertie Ahern stated at the UN Millennium Summit that at the time of joining the UN Ireland was “poorer than most of our European neighbours”[2]. Ireland was not in a position to help its own citizens and couldn’t take responsibility for Refugees from another state. Ireland was at that time a very xenophobic country who had finally defeated England and declared itself a Republic but now people who didn’t speak Irish or English were looking to live in the country that generations of Irish people had died for. The inherited feelings are beyond that of mere anti-Semitism as mentioned by Ward (133-136), the only people who would be welcomed with open arms in Ireland at that time were Roman Catholics.

Ignoring Jewish refugees extended from the Department of External Affairs to the Department of Industry and Commerce to the Department of Justice who felt they should be discouraged as they won’t integrate with Ireland’s communities. De Valera proposed taking 10,000 refugees, all of whom were to have relatives in Ireland and who were not in direct competition with Irish people for their chosen profession. Ward feels this is prejudice (134) but realistically if Ireland were to accept refugees during a period of high unemployment they should be qualified people who add to the workforce. Perhaps De Valeras proposal was a quick response to the sixty million displaced Jews in Post WWII Europe. In October 1949 272 Estonians were found aboard a vessel en route to Canada, however Ireland neither paid for their passage nor would support them should they stay in Ireland. This was an important decision for the state to make because it created a example whereby Refugees would be at a disadvantage if they were travelling via Ireland to the Americas. It also created a precedent for not accommodating refugees who arrive unexpected.

The International Refugee Organisation visited Ireland in 1950 lobbying for greater rights for refugees; they succeeded in creating six new principles by which Ireland could accept refugees. In 1951 The Counsel of Europe defined what a refugee was and Ireland also created its definition as someone who is unable to return to their home territory.

I do believe Ward spends too much time building up to the Hungarian Refugee incident and not enough explaining what the effects of it were. However it is important to understand that Ireland was not necessarily against the idea of taking refugees but it was something that had never been considered before. The end of WWII created sixty million refugees, Ireland didn’t take responsibility. In 1949 hundreds of refugees landed in Ireland and suddenly rights and definitions had to be created. It appears the next step on the international stage was to actually embrace these new policies the opportunity was the Hungarian Refugees.

The Department of the Taoiseach, Justice, Defence, External Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Health and Social Welfare were all involved in the decision to take the Hungarian Refugees and the criteria included suitable race and religion as well as a security screening. Even when Ireland attempted to provide rights they were still conditional. The refugees arrived in 1956 and by 1957 they were on hunger strike because of the conditions in their camp. Although Denmark and Canada were also experiencing trouble with Hungarian Refugees, Ireland was neglecting their responsibility. In the Dail Frank Aiken said they were “free to leave at any-time”. Ireland changed its status under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from “resettlement” to “second asylum” in doing so they were relieved of primary responsibility for the refugees. The refugees didn’t want to remain in Ireland and Ireland didn’t want them to stay. Both sides had expressed their discontent and by 1958 only 61 of the original 541 refugees remained in Ireland.

I don’t think Ireland was prepared for the refugees nor did it want them. Ward neglects to mention the importance of the language barrier, instead focusing on Ireland’s sub-standard treatment of the Refugees. According to the UN reports the biggest problem was the language barrier[3]. The same report suggests that the Hungarians were welcomed with “open arms” but perhaps if they could understand the language used in the Dail by Frank Aiken they would think otherwise.

Trocaire believes that the UN convention on Refugees does not identify how states should deal with refugees (Connolly & Roddy: 9-11)[4]. This confirms Wards belief that a misinterpretation of the 1951 Convention as well as the pressure Ireland exerted on itself to act in line with fellow UN countries allowed an unprepared Ireland to harbour refugees. The treatment of the refugees was a mix of trial and error as well as reactionary measures and unfortunately the state was unable to provide infrastructure for full integration. This coupled with the xenophobic mindset of an adolescent nation in economic turmoil created the disaster that was the Hungarian Refugee crisis.

The title is the most accurate line of this paper, it was shouted by Deputy McQuillan to Minister Aiken in a Dail debate. This explains the governments motivation and how they could have done it.

Bibliography

Connolly, Jerome. Roddy, Joan. 2001. “A half century of Refugee Rights: Assessing the past and Future Contribution of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” Trocaire Development Review, Dublin.
(Available online: http://www.trocaire.org/uploads/pdfs/tdr/
DR2001_ahalfcenturyofrefugeerights_1951genevaconvention.pdf )

Dowling, Cathal. 1996. “Irish Policy on the Representation of China at the United Nations, 1957-59” Source: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7 pp.81-95. Published by: Royal Irish Academy

Ottonello, Paola.1999. “Irish-Italian Diplomatic Relations in World War II: The Irish Perspective”
Source: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. pp. 91-103. Published by: Royal Irish Academy

UNHCR article 2006. “Hungarian refugee crisis presented Ireland with a new challenge” (available online http://www.unric.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7144&Itemid=42)

Endnotes

[1] Ottonello, Paola.1999. “Irish-Italian Diplomatic Relations in World War II: The Irish Perspective”
Source: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. pp. 91-103. Published by: Royal Irish Academy

[2] Bertie Ahern addressing the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York, 2000. A copy of his speech is available online: http://www.un.org/millennium/webcast/statements/ireland.htm

[3] UNHCR article 2006. “Hungarian refugee crisis presented Ireland with a new challenge” available online http://www.unric.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7144&Itemid=42

[4] Connolly, Jerome. Roddy, Joan. 2001. “A half century of Refugee Rights: Assessing the past and Future Contribution of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” Trocaire Development Review, Dublin. Available online: http://www.trocaire.org/uploads/pdfs/tdr/DR2001_ahalfcenturyofrefugeerights_1951genevaconvention.pdf

Why was Ireland involved in the Congo Crisis?

Ireland joined the United Nations (UN) in 1955 they were eager to make an impact on the world stage through neutrality. Membership of the UN obliged Ireland to follow certain requests. One such request was the Congo Crisis which seized the African Nation from 1960-1966 and was an event that both Irish Soldiers and Irish Diplomats were at the heart of. On July 19th 1960 Ireland sent 1,000 troops to join the peace keeping force Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) at the request of Dag Hammarskjöld the Secretary General of the United Nations. In June 1961 Dag Hammarskjöld selected Conor Cruise O’Brien as his special representative to The Congo. In the same year Ireland was elected to the UN Security Council.

Both Irish soldiers and diplomats failed to stop the momentum of the crisis and at the peak of Irish involvement Dag Hammarskjöld died whilst travelling by plane in an accident that was never explained. It is possible that Ireland’s involvement in the Congo Crisis caused more harm than good and that is certainly the opinion of the UN. This paper seeks to justify Ireland’s involvement in the Congo and to investigate if it was beneficial to the efforts of the UN and also to the Congo. This paper will examine the local and international interest groups in The Congo before and during the crisis, the UN and Irelands involvement in the area, with particular attention to the Irish Defence Forces and O’Brien’s contribution and the consequences of that engagement.

Ireland may have been involved in the Congo Crisis to protect Swedish neutrality by entrusting Irish representatives in key decision making positions in the Congo.

National & International Interest

The Congo Crisis occurred when the South-East Congolese province of Katanga seceded from the other five Congolese states. The North of Katanga is dominated by the Baluba Tribe whilst the South was under the control of the combination of the Luanda and the Bayeke tribes. These two tribes formed the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (Conakat) led by Moise Tchombe in 1959 and the Baluba tribe reacted by forming the Balubakat Cartel. In May 1960 Katanga held it’s first ever Provincial Assembly Elections and Conakat defeated Balubakat. Conakat did receive support from the white settlers of Katanga[1] and there is rumour that these elections were corrupted to protect the white settlers of Katanga.

Katanga was the wealthiest state in the Congo, rich with copper, silver, platinum and uranium. These minerals caused Katanga to experience an influx of Western settlers from Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK). The numbers of settlers expanded from 4,824 in 1924[2] to 34,047 in 1956[3] a large contingent of these settlers were directly involved in mining companies. The Belgium Company Union Miniere worked closely with the British company Tanganyika Concessions Limited (Tanks) as Tanks could provide access to the Port of Lobito in Angola via the Benguela Railway Company. The principle stakeholders in the Union Miniere were the Belgium State (60%) and the British company Tanks (40%)[4] and their interests were the exploitation of resources in Katanga, not the political climate of The Congo. Thus both Belgium and Britain were in favour of Katanga seceding from The Congo although they could not publicly show their support.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) declared itself a state on June 30th 1960 with Patrice Lumumba as its first Prime Minister forcing Belgium to withdraw from the country. Three days later Belgium dissolved its semi-state body: Comitespecial du Katanga, which had the power to appoint four of the six members of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. The newly established DRC had lost 184,746 votes to private share holders and had lost control of the mining companies of Katanga.[5] The DRC Military kept Belgium officers in high ranks which caused a military mutiny within a matter of days. As the chaos of a newly established nation with a military mutiny raged Tshombe declared Katanga to be an independent state on July 11th 1960. Belgium and Britain thought favourably of Tshombe who represented the White Settler; some critics believe the settlers groomed him for his position.[6]

Beyond Africa, the Cold War was creating a global frenzy. This allowed developing and recently independent states to play Capitalist West against the Communist East. The Eisenhower Administration had an economic interest in Katanga[7] and even supported Belgium paratroopers and the bombing of Port Matadi[8]. It is considered more then coincidence that Lumumba was assassinated days before Eisenhower left office[9]. The UN Security Council passed Resolution [S4741][10] on 21st February 1961 which entitled ONUC to use force to prevent a civil war. In 1961 the Kennedy Administration entered office and began a new departure on the Congo Crisis by opposing the secession of Katanga. The United States of America (USA) felt that the remaining five states of the DRC might turn to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for assistance in removing Tshombe from Katanga[11]. The USSR had supported Lumumba[12] but could be interested in Katanga and Tshombe if Britain and Belgium were not involved. However, the USSR recognised that most African nations did not want secession for Katanga as it would threaten their own sovereignty.

On July 14th 1960 the UN, under worldwide pressured to intervene in the Katanga secession and did so in response to Patrice Lumumbas request by sending 14,000 troops to the region and demanding that Belgium withdraw their army[13]. The UN entered the Congo as a neutral organisation on a peace keeping mission. On 17th January 1961 Lumumba was assassinated in Katanga. The perpetrators have never been brought to justice but the suspects include The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), General Mobutu (who had seized power by military coup September 14th 1960), and Minister for the Interior; Munongo or local Katanga villagers.

Irelands Defence Force Interest

At the time of the Congo Crisis Ireland had five years of experience as a member of the UN. Before joining the UN Ireland had little practice in international affairs but during those first five years Ireland experienced both success and failure. Ireland attempted to introduce 541 Hungarian refugees in 1956 adhering to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. By 1958 only 61 refugees remained in Ireland as the refugees emigrated further and even went on hunger strike[14]. Ireland did experience limited success in the UN when Frank Aiken voted for three years in favour of talks regarding China joining the UN. This bold act against the wishes of the USA earned Ireland international respect as a neutral state which could not manipulated by world powers despite the USA reformulating the policy to suit its own interest.[15]

On 19th July 1960 Dag Hammarskjöld requested Irish troops for a UN Peace Keeping mission in the Congo. Ireland supported the UN by supplying 6,191 members of the Irish Defence Force between July 1960 and June 1964, Sean McKeown was appointed Force Commander of UNOC from January 1961 to November 1962[16] and although Ireland had sent infantry abroad since joining the UN, they had never engaged in combat. Defending foreign territory is never easy; in September 1961 one company was intercepted at Jadotville, layed siege upon for four days and fooled into surrendering their arms by secessionists.[17] Irish troops also entered combat with Belgium Mercenaries. A grim incident occurred on the 8th November 1960 at Niemba when Baluba tribesmen ambushed a regiment and killed nine Irish infantry. The public response to this atrocity and the six other deaths in the Congo was one of pride in Ireland. Finally the country could feel pride in the pursuit of peace after many years of war by defending neutrality as the conflict involved Europeans, Conakat secessionists and Baluba non-secessionists.[18] Ireland entered the Congo unprepared and ill-equipped as they were flown out in an aircraft from the USA and they were going to a tropical climate sporting heavy jackets made of bull’s wool.[19]

“It would be an exaggeration to believe that, even in this earlier period, Ireland always judged issues entirely on their merits and took absolutely no account of national interest or of relationships with important countries.”[20]

Exactly why Ireland was involved in the Congo is a question not easily answered. A state in Africa experiences conflict resulting in a province stating independence and Ireland sends almost all its troops to help alleviate the situation.

It is possible that Ireland had an altruistic interest in the Congo and hence no sides were taken as those breaking the peace were from Europe as well as Africa. Ireland could not have believed that the UN was operating as a neutral organisation due to the strong influence from the USA coupled with the fact that the UN deployed forces to the Congo as soon as Lumumba implied the involvement of the USSR. Ireland may have involved itself in the Congo to achieve more influence internationally and the UN was the only international instrument in Ireland’s possession. However some critics conjure that Ireland entered the Congo solely with neutrality and white flags in mind[21].

Another possibility is that Ireland entered the Congo to bring international
attention to the Northern Ireland question. Although the question had been
answered in 1922 as Northern Ireland seceded from the Irish Free State under
the Anglo-Irish Treaty. This “national baggage” has since burdened those
on both sides of the border. If Ireland were to successfully defend neutrality and
in doing so united the Congo under the auspices of the UN then there would be a
realistic case to open ask the Northern Ireland question again based on a good result achieved through neutrality. However, not all of Ireland’s contributions were neutral as many Irish soldiers were involved in the looting of Leopoldsville making a “thorough job of it”[22]. The massacred victims were unarmed civilians who were terrorised by Irish “Peace keeping” troops.

Jack McQuillan approached Taoiseach Sean Lemass about favouring Katanga above Northern Ireland,

“You can be a sore thumb about Katanga and partition, but you do not raise the question of our own Partition in the United Nations where you should. You are able to settle the problems of every country in the world except your own. Let us look after our own back garden first”[23]

Lemass had no reply. Although the Congo Crisis could bring the Northern Ireland question to the international stage, perhaps more loyal faction of the country were frustrated by the efforts that Ireland was contributing to Katanga. Resources that could be used in Ireland.

A part success of Ireland in the UN involves
discussions about China joining the UN. This was an issue on the world stage pitting the honest USA against Red China. In this Ireland stood against Western Powers claiming that the UN was an international medium to solve problems and not a forum where states complemented each other. Ireland appeared to have much more in common with the USA then China at that time and it was difficult to justify Frank Aikens vote. However the issue that prevented China from joining the UN was an issue close to Irish hearts. Frank Aiken voted to include China in the UN but also to allow Formosa (modern day Tiawan) to have independence. Aiken wanted the island of Formosa to be independent[24] and perhaps his reasons were rooted in Ireland’s own quest for freedom as an island to secede from the UK. This may explain Aiken persistence in voting for a discussion on China for three years and not promote the Peking Government.

However, considering Aikens later reaction to O’Brien’s Operation Morthor, it is unlikely he used the UN to promote the Northern Ireland problem. If Ireland had a hidden agenda in the UN from 1957-59 what could have changed such an agenda before the Congo Crisis. For Frank Aiken Irelands involvement in the Congo was “one of the great turning points of history”[25] but could it be possible that Aiken was referring to Irelands own history and the possible outcomes of a united Congo inspired by Irish neutrality. If Ireland could prove capable of reuniting provinces to form a country in Africa through neutral means surely Ireland could unite its own provinces to form the state of Ireland., with similar means, perhaps involving UN peace keeping corps.

Article 25 of the UN Charter states “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”[26], therefore Ireland was compelled to oblige the UN Security Council.

However, in April 1961 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as part of the Border Campaign killed a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Following this the Department of External Affairs refused a request from the UN for more Irish troops to be sent to the Congo due to the heightened “tension” in Ireland[27]. If Ireland was using the Congo Crisis for its own domestic non-partition campaign, surely the IRA would be aware of the consequences of their actions for the Congo campaign.

Irelands Diplomatic Interest

Irish diplomacy was at an all time high during the Congo Crisis. Freddie Boland was appointed President of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1960. He preceded over a gathering of possibly the most diverse world leaders. Central to the UNGA was the Congo Crisis and central to that was Ireland. Both Nikita Khruschev and Fidel Castro attended the Autumn UNGA where the truth of colonialism and its legacy were exposed. Boland’s role as President was not random and perhaps the UN wanted a neutral nation to lead proceedings when East meets West.

In November 1960 Noel Browne, an Independent TD, demanded that Taoiseach Sean Lemass assign a representative to the Congo. To which the Taoiseach replied

“We were not sufficiently informed about the situation in the Congo to make a proper appreciation of it, we should not, in my opinion, regard ourselves under any obligation to make that appreciation”.[28]

This view expressed by the Taoiseach of Ireland contradicts the sheer volume of Irelands Defence Force deployed in the Congo and their efforts as instructed by Sean McKeown. Lemass did justify Ireland’s involvement in the Congo as a Christian duty and an obligation to the UN.[29] However the UN appealed for Sean McKeown to be Commander of all UNOC forces which the government agreed to in December 1960. This promotion guaranteed that more Irish troops would be sent to the Congo.

On After four years representing Ireland as a member of the UN Assembly, Conor Cruise O’Brien was offered a promotion of sorts. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General, requested O’Brien work as part of the UN Secretariat as Special Representative to Elisabethville in Katanga. O’Brien believed that he was chosen by Hammarskjöld because he had voted pro-China alongside Aiken in the UN Assemblies.

“The reasons which deepened the hostility of the United Kingdom delegation, were also, I believe the reasons for my being invited by Mr Hammarskjöld to join the secretariat”[30].

He also believed Hammarskjöld was expressing an appreciation for his 1951 fictional work; Maria Cross.[31] O’Brien faced numerous challenges in Katanga namely; Katanga’s secession, Lumumbas assassination and the ever dubious role of Union Miniere. Beyond international recognition for Katanga, Tshombes government also wanted to keep the industries which made Katanga so valuable. Instead of paying revenues to the Congolese government, Union Miniere was paying this surplus to Katanga, amounting to £14,000,000 per year[32].

This money in turn allowed Tshombe to build a sizeable army led by Belgium mercenaries[33] and soldiers of fortune from South Africa and British Rhodesia.[34] There were an estimated six thousand soldiers in Tshombes Gendarmerie movement compared with the UNs force of almost twenty thousand soldiers.[35] O’Brien since his deployment had been busy trying to round up and deport all the foreign mercenaries that Tshombe had bankrolled, as it was legal for the UN to do so under UNSC Resolution [S4741].

On 28th August 1961 O’Brien launched Operation Rumpunch as authorised by Hammarskjöld. This was surprise disarmament of the Katanga troops, key military assets were seized and foreign mercenaries were captured. O’Brien also seized the control of radio, post and telephone facilities in Elisabethville. O’Brien made a radio announcement pleading his supporters to continue supporting the UN. By 11am Tshombe made a radio broadcast promising to remove foreign mercenaries from Katanga and the biggest prize of the swoop was the ever troublesome General Godefroid Munongo. A total of 350 soldier’s surrendered and over 80 mercenaries were captured.[36]

Tshombe realised that Operation Rumpunch was an attempt to remove foreign mercenaries from his army and not an attempt to end the secession of Katanga. Tshombe did receive support from the Belgium and the UK prompting Hammarskjöld to announce that only a civil war by led by Tshombe would constitute another UN intervention. Operation Rumpunch was O’Brien’s greatest accomplishment in the Congo. The Belgium consular corps stopped Operation Rumpunch before it was complete, thus leaving many foreign mercenaries still in Katanga. Of the mercenaries that left Katanga many could re-enter via Northern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was this part success that inspired O’Brien to make another attempt to finally rid the Congo of the Katanga secession.[37] O’Brien had to act because he knew Tshombe would not trust him after the surprise of Operation Rumpunch. The situation was at a peak as Baluba refugee camps were becoming overpopulated and under threat from Katangese soldiers The Congo informed the UN that it would seek USSR backing and invade Katanga backing unless they intervened immediately.

O’Brien had other intentions and began plotting another swoop. On September 12th against O’Brien’s request, Tshombe refused to repatriate his remaining mercenaries. This was the catalyst that made O’Brien launch Operation Morthor on 13th September, which translates from Hindi as Operation Smash. This aptly named mission would finish the work of Operation Rumpunch by seizing foreign mercenaries. Also included on the list were ministers of Katanga’s Government as well as Tshombe and Munongo. The arrest warrants were signed by the Congolese Government and not the UN Security Council. The aim was take over public buildings in Elisabethville, raise the Congolese flag and to surround the presidential palace and force Tshombe to surrender[38] thus ending the secession of Katanga. The operation was a disaster finishing on 21st September with many on the arrest list escaped and 150 Irish troops stationed in Jadotville were surrounded for days and obliged to surrender. Tshombe escaped to Rhodesia which O’Brien claimed was aided by the British consul.[39] O’Brien, however announced to correspondents that “The secession of Katanga is over”[40]. Hammarskjöld had explained Operation Morthor in S/4940, however he neglected to mention the word Morthor or ending the secession of Katanga in his report. The report insisted that Katangese troops initiated the offence. O’Brien didn’t see this document until after the operation was over and so did not know what he was supposed to be defending;

“We could not understand what was now happening, since we did not know what was supposed to have happened”[41].

On 16th September Tshombe agreed to meet with Hammarskjöld in Rhodesia and as Hammarskjöld made his way there on September 17th, his plane crashed killing the UN Secretary General. Two separate investigations by the UN and Rhodesia proved inconclusive. Rhodesian authorities cited pilot error as the cause of the crash, ruling out foul play. The UN investigation didn’t rule out foul play but cited a lack of evidence to determine the exact cause of the crash. Major Delin and his aircraft the French-built Fouga Magister were immediately suspected of shooting down the craft Hammarskjöld travelled in; the Albertina. However the circumstances by which the tiny Fouga could have taken down the Albertina involve a lack of fuel for such a journey, lack of protection for the pilot if he were to offensively open fire and a lack of expertise to engage the craft as there was no-one qualified to drive the plane at night available[42]. O’Brien, later contested that a bullet shot by a pro-secession undercover agent on the plane had hit a wire which caused the plane to lose control[43].

Although Akenson believes different[44], the UN Resolution [S4741] allowed the UN to remove foreign mercenaries in Katanga but it didn’t allow the UN to end secession. The events of 13th-21st September were unclear and neither O’Brien nor Hammarskjöld provided a similar chain of events. O’Brien believes that Hammarskjöld only used S/4940 to please the Belgium and British interest groups. Hence the question who gave the order becomes ever more important. The inconsistency of accounts regarding Operation Morthors origins begs investigation. O’Brien insisted the orders came from Dag Hammarskjöld to his assistant Mahmoud Khiary of Tunisia, Senior UN Officer in Leopoldville who provided the arrest warrants to O’Brien in Elisabethville.

However as Hammarskjöld was dead the unintentional suspect was O’Brien. Hammarskjöld was a great loss to the international community and received the only Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded posthumously in 1961 and he had the respect of John F. Kennedy[45]. O’Brien was far from a Nobel Peace Prize, in fact his haste campaign had caused the death of many soldiers and the UN Secretary General as well as setting the secession troubles back. O’Brien’s reputation as a bullish character who acts on instinct did not work in his favour.

On October 15th 1961 Irelands permanent representative at the UN, Frank Boland, visited O’Brien and advised that he should be reassigned to New York. O’Brien insists that Boland recommended to Aiken that O’Brien be removed from the UN and then prompted the British to bypass the Foreign Minister and ask the Taoiseach, Lemass, to recall O’Brien.[46] O’Brien refused to return to New York and remained in Elisabethville until December 1st 1961 when U Thant relieved him of his services.

On December 3rd 1961 O’Brien’s resignation letter was published, this caused international uproar shaming individuals, nations and international organisations. O’Brien stated his job in the Congo as to apply Resolution [S4741]. He then condemned the British and French Governments for passing the February resolution and then doing everything in their covert power to ensure it was not correctly applied. Their dishonest manoeuvres made O’Brien’s post impossible. [47]

When Willie Norton confronted Taoiseach Sean Lemass about O’Brien being “frustrated and thwarted by other countries” (Britain, Belgium and France), Lemass was quick to show his colours; “Dr. O’Brien was acting as an official of the United Nations, not as an official of the Irish Government….It seems to me the responsibility is on the United Nations, not on the Irish Government.”[48]

When Dr. Noel Browne accused the Taoiseach of “washing his hands” of the affair to favour the mining companies of Katanga, Lemass retorted that he had no responsibility for the actions of O’Brien as he was now a private individual. There can no doubt that O’Brien was used as a scapegoat in this situation. Regardless of the outcome of Morthor and Rumpunch his own government had turned their back on him; refusing to be involved but also refusing to recognise him.

Why Ireland was so Involved

Ireland had a unique position in the aftermath of World War II (WWII) having remained neutral, maintained a type of allegiance to the Allies[49] but also expressed sorrow at the loss of Hitler[50]. Ireland was too small a state to threaten any of the big world powers and also had no colonial history in Africa that would conjure mal- sentiments.

Sweden, like Ireland, also remained neutral during WWII and was not included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nor was either a founding member of the UN. The Swedish model was something to envy, it “implied independence from all big power-blocs and –even in the event of war between the blocs a maintenance of complete independence…a good deal of moral righteousness”[51]. Perhaps when Dag Hammarskjöld, the first Swedish Secretary General, appointed O’Brien to his position he was looking to safeguard Sweden’s international reputation. Sweden had earned an impeccable status in the UN and Hammarskjöld knew that the Congo Crisis was too big an issue to take on in his own role and it was too fragile an issue to risk assigning a Swedish diplomat. Hammarskjöld knew when he assigned O’Brien that the Irishman had proved difficult towards the larger nations at the UN and that the UK had a particular dislike of him.

Hammarskjöld knew the Congo Crisis was impossible to solve especially when Western Powers were on both sides of the fence; Belgium, the UK and France acting pro-secession of Katanga and the USA and remainder of the UN were anti-secession. If the Congo Crisis could not be solved without stepping a few Western toes it was better to pass the poison chalice to an unknown scapegoat, rather then risk jeopardising Sweden’s international reputation. The subsequent actions of O’Brien caused his fellow countrymen to turn on him; Dr. Noel Browne believed “We stood by the assassination of Mr. Lumumba and now we are standing by the diplomatic assassination of Dr. Conor Cruise O’Brien”[52]

There were two main differences between Operation Rumpunch and Operation Morthor. Operation Rumpunch was successful and authorised by Hammarskjöld. Morthor was unsuccessful and not publicly authorised by Hammarskjöld. The motivation for both operations was the same; to end secession, however only one operation could justify its agenda. If operation Morthor was authorised by Hammarskjöld, Lemass would have praised it. The reason being that regardless of the outcome Sweden’s position among the world powers as a magnificent paradigm of neutrality was an example to emulate.

For Lemass to agree with O’Brien’s actions would cause embarrassment to our own national reputation. Perhaps O’Brien was ordered to instigate Operation Morthor, if so it was an order from the Western interested parties in the UN. Knowing that it there were Western powers on both sides of the fence, it was best to reject O’Brien entirely as an Irish Diplomat. In which case we could still take a neutral position and allow O’Brien test the waters of international opinion. Whilst Hammarskjöld became Nobel Peace Prize Winner and Sweden’s international reputation grew stronger, O’Brien had to resign from the UN to tell the truth. McKeown agreed with O’Brien that he had been prevented by doing his job by the very people that asked him to do it[53].

When the facts, in particular the economic alliances that benefitted from O’Brien’s decision are considered the situation becomes rather transparent. Irish troops were withdrawn from the Congo. Frank Aiken seemed convinced that the Irish contingent had performed their job and the Congolese leaders had finally seen the only solution was peace but when pressed during the same session Aiken evaded the question had Irish troops attempted reunite the Congo by force ?[54] Ireland had compromised its neutrality during Rumpunch, Morthor and even the attack incited on innocent civilians in Leopoldsville. Ireland had sacrificed its position as a neutral state and engaged in combat with another nation. Sweden had not done so because their involvement was providing troops and ordering the successful Operation Rumpunch. Ireland conversely had provided troops, ordered the failure of Operation Morthor as well as providing the Force Commander of UNOC. Sweden also sacrificed an international martyr for peace whose departure absolved him from any allegations of ordering Operation Morthor.

The Irish Defence Forces had represented Ireland well in Katanga, besides the fact that they were in combat as a neutral peace keeper. A total of twenty six Irish troops died in Katanga of whom the nation was very proud. The compensation for these soldiers was also very high in respect of the times; Irl£3,500. was the price of a married man and Irl£2,000[55] was the price of a single man. Letters of condolences came from both England and the USA[56]. Despite the incident at Leopoldsville where Irish troops were involved in raiding a community, these soldiers had defended the peace for the representing the Irish people in a battle between the super powers. But how neutral was Ireland ? Definitely not as neutral as Sweden.

The series of events in The Congo can only render Ireland culpable which was perhaps why; beyond the public reasons of neutrality and lack of colonial history, Sweden and Hammarskjöld insisted on Ireland’s involvement at the helm of operations. O’Brien’s appointment remains an invalidated shock and although the Irish Defence Forces involvement can be justified, the power ceded to the unprepared McKeown clad in a bulls wool jacket can’t. These appointments question why Sweden gave up two positions of power. Perhaps Hammarskjöld knew The Congo was about to erupt and Western interests on both sides of the fence would mean forfeiting neutrality and possibly making enemies.

Regardless of McKeon’s promotion being a method of obtaining more soldiers, the fact still remains that Sweden did provide more troops in Katanga. That said, McKeown was in charge of implementing orders. This may have been another clever ploy from Hammarskjöld to maintain Sweden’s strong involvement without having to jeopardise allocating a position of power which could be held liable, in turn making Sweden accountable. Therefore risking Swedish neutrality. Sweden put the largest number of soldiers into Katanga but held no responsibility for them. Ireland was proud of McKeown and his troops, however O’Brien became the scourge of the nation and his only followers were the ever opportunistic opposition party.

By the same spineless accord, Lemass recognised O’Brien only as an individual that worked for the UN, answerable to the UN, who then became a private individual, he thus eliminated Ireland from involvement in the disaster of Operation Morthor.[57] Despite a barbaric attack on locals in Leopoldsville, the Irish Defence Forces were welcomed as heroes, without questioning why McKeown readily accepted O’Brien’s orders on September 13th. Thereby Ireland was still a neutral country, unfortunately involved in Operation Morthor as it was ordered by a private individual working for the UN, O’Brien, the scapegoat.

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Endnotes

[1] Saideman, S., 2001,“The ties that divide: ethnic politics, foreign policy, and international conflict”, New York, Published by Columbia University Press, pp39
.

[2] Ministere des Colonies Belgique, 1947,“Report Annuel sur la Colonie du Congo Belge en 1924”, pp.258, featured in Lemarchand, R., 1962, “The Limits of Self-Determination : The Case of the Katanga Secession”, Rene Lemarchand, The American Political Science Review, Published American Political Science Vol. 56, No.2 p.404-416
[3]
Ministere des Colonies, statistics, 1959, “La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda Urundi en 1958”, Ministere des Colonies. pp.22, featured in Lemarchand, R., 1962, “The Limits of Self-Determination : The Case of the Katanga Secession”, Rene Lemarchand, The American Political Science Review, Published by American Political Science,Vol. 56, No.2 pp 404-416

[4] Hughes, M., 2007, Canada,“Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis 1958-1965”, International History Review Vol. 25 Chap. 3 pp 595

[5] Goncharov, L., 1963, “New forms of Colonialism in Africa” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 468-9, New York, Cambridge University Press
[6]
Emmanuel, A., 1972, “White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism” New Left Review I/73, pp. 40. London, Published by Verso
[7]
Gibbs Gibbs, D., 1991,“The political economy of Third World intervention: mines, money, and U.S. policy in the Congo crisis” London, Published by University of Chicago Press, pp 103-110

[8] Wright, G., 1997, “The destruction of a nation: United States’ policy towards Angola since 1945”, Bristol, Published by Pluto Press, pp 26.

[9] Ibid p.28

[10] UN Security Council Resolution [S4741] Available http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1961/scres61.htm

[11] U.S. Department of State Office of The Historian, 13/01/1995 Foreign Relations, 1961-63, Vol. XX, Congo Crisis, Available http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/summaries/950113_FRUS_XX_1961-63.html , date Accessed 4/5/09
[12]
Wright, G., 1997, “The destruction of a nation: United States’ policy towards Angola since 1945”, Bristol, Published by Pluto Press, pp 27

[13] UN resolution [S/4387] Available www.un.org/arabic/documents/GADocs/A_4510english.pdf
[14]
Ward, E., 1996, “A big show-off to show what we could do” – Ireland and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis of 1956″, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7 (1996), 131-141, Dublin, Published by: Royal Irish Academy, pp 137

[15] Dowling, C., 1996, “Irish Policy on the Representation of China at the United Nations, 1957-59”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7, 81-95. Published by: Royal Irish Academy. pp 157

[16] English, Adrian J. 2005. “Irish Army Orders of Battle 1923-2004”, Maryland USA, Published by Ravi Rikhye, pp 55

[17] O’Halpin, E., 1999, “Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922”. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp 271

[18] Ibid

[19] English, Adrian J. 2005. “Irish Army Orders of Battle 1923-2004” Published by Ravi Rikhye, pp 55

[20] Tonra, B., Ward, E., Keatinge, P., 2002, “Ireland in international affairs: interests, institutions and identities: essays in honour of Professor N.P. Keatinge, FTCD, MRIA”, Ireland, Published by Institute of Public Administration. pp 115

[21] Ishizuka,K.,. 2004, “Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000: A Study of Irish Motivation”, London, Published by Routledge. pp 29

[22] Irish Independent. 11th April 1962 “UN Troops in Katanga are accused”, pp 1

[23] Dail Debates, 15/11/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 171-172
[24] O’Connor, J., 1966, “Frank Aiken Oral History Interview – 9/15/1966”, Administrative Information for JFK Library. Place of Interview: Dublin, Ireland. [16]-[17]. Available http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Oral+History+Project/Aiken_Frank_09_15_66_oh.htm Date Accessed 3/5/09

[25] Irish Times Reporter, August 17 1960, The Irish Times August 17 1960, pp 9

[26] UN Charter http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter5.shtml
[27]
NAI, DT, Memo for Government from DFA, 26/4/1961, File S16137H/61

[28] Dail Debates,23/11/1960 Vol 185, No 1, Columns 1-3

[29] Dail Debates,23/11/1960 Vol 185, No 1, Columns 164-176

[30] O’Brien. C.C., 1962, “To Katanga and back: a UN case history”, New York, Published by Simon and Schuster, pp 50
[31]
Wheatcroft, G. 2003 “No Regrets, no surrender”, featured in The Guardian 12th July 2003

[32] Packham, Eric S. 1996. “Freedom and anarchy”. New York, Published by Nova Publishers. P 28

[33] Moraes, F.,1965,“The importance of being black: an Asian looks at Africa”, New York, Published by Macmillan, pp 208

[34] De Waal, A., 2002, “Demilitarizing the mind: African agendas for peace and security”, Trenton NJ, Published by Africa World Press, pp 117

[35] Meisler, S., 1997, “United Nations: The First Fifty Years”, New York, Published by Atlantic Monthly Press, P124

[36] Sitkowski, A., Mazowiecki, T., 2006, “UN peacekeeping: myth and reality”, Westport CT, Published by Greenwood Publishing Group, pp71

[37] O’Neill, J. Rees, N., 2005, “United Nations peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era” New York, Published by Taylor & Francis, pp52

[38] Meisler, S., 1997, “United Nations: The First Fifty Years”, New York, Published by Atlantic Monthly Press, P125-127

[39] Mahoney, Richard D. 1983. “JFK: ordeal in Africa”, New York, Published by Oxford University Press, 1983, pp100

[40] O’Brien, C.C., 1962, “To Katanga and back: a UN case history”, New York, Published by Simon and Schuster. P 268.

[41] O’Brien, C.C., 1999, “Memoir: My life and Themes”, London, Profile Books London, P228

[42] Rosio, B. 1993, “The Ndola Crash and the Death of Dag Hammarskjold”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 661-671. New York, Cambridge University Press

[43] O’Brien,C.C., 1992, Article appearing in the “The Guardian” 11th September 1992

[44] Harman Akenson, Donald. 1994. “Conor; A biography of Conor Cruise O’Brien”, Canada, McGill-Queens University Press. P170 Akenson believes O’Briens actions were in line with his position under UN Mandate of Resolutions

[45] John F. Kennedy, 25th September 1961 address to UN General Assembly in New York City, referring to Hammarskjölds death as “A noble servant of peace is gone” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03UnitedNations09251961.htm , Date Accessed 5/5/09

[46] O’Brien, C.C., 1999, “Memoir: My life and Themes”, London, Profile Books London, pp 244

[47] O’Brien,C.C., 1961, Resignation Letter featured in New York Times and London Observer 3rd December 1961

[48] Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245

[49] DeRouen, K., Heo, U. 2005, “Defense and Security: A Compendium of National Armed Forces and Security Policies” Santa Barbara California, Published by ABC-CLIO. Explains how Ireland provided military intelligence to UK during WWII and allowing ally planes to pass over Ireland

[50] Lightbody, B., 2004, “The Second World War: ambitions to nemesis”, London, Published by Routledge, pp258

[51] Salmon, T. 1989, “Unnuetral Ireland an ambivalent and unique Security Policy”, Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 48-81

[52] Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1248

[53] Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245

[54] Dail Debates, 15/11/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 168

[55] NAI, DT, Cabinet Minutes 29/11/1960, File S16965

[56] NAI, DT, Letters of condolences, File S16965

[57] Dail Debates, 6/12/1961, Vol. 192, Columns 1245

Hey in this section you will find an essay entitle ‘The Real cost of Botswanas Economic Success’ which examines how indigenous culture traded off with money for diamonds. This questions the title of ‘Africas success story’ and indeed how success can be measured.

Further down in this section you will find a response to the ‘Aid, Debt Relief, and New Sources of Finance for meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ paper which was produced from the UN’s UNIWIDER. As with most UN documents, it is full of contradictions and smoothing over of rough statistics.

“The real cost of Botswana’s economical success”

“Botswana stands out as a unique example of an enduring multi-party democracy with a record of sound economic management, that has used its diamond riches for national advancement and maintained an administration free of corruption”
Martin Meredith (2006:686)[1]

Botswana announced it’s independence from its British Protectorate in 1966; this was a brave move for a state whose capital budget and even a major portion of the recurrent budget relied on British Aid. The four decades since have seen Botswana’s GDP growth rate soar to 14%, making it the fastest growing economy in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). However HIV rates are also increasing at the highest rate in SSA this coupled with the neglect of the agriculture industry and an overreliance on mining as an export, create an uncertain view about the extent of Botswana’s success.

Botswana is renowned as SSA’s success story, producing the majority of the world’s diamonds. Multi-party democratic elections have existed here since independence in 1966. Botswana is one of few countries in Africa that can boast they were never colonized in the traditional sense and it is also the least corrupt country on the continent according to Transparency International[2].

Geographically Botswana is landlocked by Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. According to The Institute of Advanced Studies in Vienna this position is a disadvantage in terms of development[3]. The United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDG) also recognises this disadvantage and vow to provide landlocked states special assistance[4]. Botswana is listed as “likely” to achieve their MDG[5] of increasing FDI, trade and improving their private sector by 2015. Hence, the geographical position of Botswana is unrelated to their success. Paul Collier in “The Bottom Billion” states that when a country has a surplus of a certain natural resource that becomes it’s defining feature rather then being landlocked (2007:56)[6].

Botswana is the world’s largest producer of quality diamonds, which were officially discovered in 1955. Since June 23rd 1968 De Beers has mined the diamonds. Eventually the Botswana Government and De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd established Debswana, whereby Botswana shared half of the proceeds of it’s diamonds with De Beers[7]. This revenue is earned through taxation, dividends and royalties of diamonds which accounts for 45%[8] of government revenues. Botswana has played a key role in the UN’s Kimberley Process which sought to reduce “Conflict Diamonds” and restore human rights to people working in mines.

However, this involvement in regulation is an act of preservation. It is not in Botswana’s interests to have further regulations imposed on an export that accounts for almost half its GDP. Also by leading the initiative against “conflict diamonds” Botswana can retain consumer confidence in the origin of their diamonds through the best publicity possible.

Botswana’s may have a near perfect model for exporting diamonds, however this industry is having an adverse affect on the people of Botswana. Botswana’s population of just over 1.6 million make it one of the most sparsely populated states in the world. Of this sparse population, the rate of AIDS is growing at unprecedented levels. In 2005 24% of the population was HIV positive[9]. This is not a surprising rate for a SSA country however it is large number for the country with the largest growth rate in the world per capita over the last forty years.

The unique boom once Botswana discovered diamonds created a vacuum of attention for national health issues. People who began working in mines were forced to change their way of life. Workers were relocated to campsites and purpose built townships around quarries where they work for weeks on end. Many workers are forced to leave their families behind and eventually turn to prostitutes for company, the consequences of which can be spreading the HIV virus locally and throughout the company workforce. Alternatively short term contract workers, who can constitute as much as 40%[10] of a mines workforce, are constantly moving from project to project. It is this group that is spreading HIV at a frightening level.

In 1998 after 40% of some staff sectors were found to be HIV positive, diamond magnate Debswana offered its permanent workers free anti-retroviral treatment (ART) to combat the effects of AIDS and help prolong lives. This can be regarded as an act in Debswana’s own interest and not in interest in Botswana when the consequences of HIV are considered.

The affect of HIV on the workforce can lead to absenteeism, a loss of productivity, a loss of time to find and train short and long term replacements and also benefit payments need to be increased. In GDP terms it is akin to decline and closure of Botswana’s entire minerals sector of the economy for a 15 year period[11]. It is in the economic interests of a company to ensure its workforce is healthy. Mining companies must confront the problem and choose to react to it or to ignore it. By the year 2020 (at the 2000 rates of HIV prevalence) Botswana stands to loose an estimated 31% of it’s workforce to HIV and the majority of the workforce will be adolescents creating a chimney effect whereby a large portion of adults will be reduced due to a diminishing life expectancy as a result of HIV[12].

Louis Nchindo, Debswanas Managing Director admitted his motivations “It’s cost effective, if we didn’t do anything it would cost us a lot more”. However criticisms aside, the overall AIDS rate was reduced by 6% over a 5 year period in the permanent workforce[13]. In 2001 free ART[14] was introduced nationwide. However this did little to prevent the real AIDS catalyst that is the short term contract workers. Between the years 1998 and 2001 these contract workers had no access to ART and when it was introduced in 2001 many workers would have to travel up to 250kms to access their life-prolonging medication.

The stigma of AIDS will always be a problem. Many people don’t want to be seen visiting a clinic and so they will travel great distances to visit a clinic elsewhere. This loss of time affects not only the diamond companies but the entire economy. However the stigma is gradually declining which can be measured by the amount of people attending the national distribution centres for HIV tests. The overall number of HIV tests increased 134% from 60,846 people in 2004 to 142,468 in 2005. As the stigma is reduced more people take the test and the more overwhelming and daunting the results become: 32% tested positive to HIV in 2004 and 42% tested positive in 2005.[15] There is no sign of this number decreasing as more and more people get tested every year.

Botswana contains the Kalahari Reserve, which is home to the San tribe, Africa’s most ancient tribe and SSA’s first inhabitants. They have lived for hundreds of generations as hunter gatherers in the Kalahari Reserve undisturbed by the world outside as they preserve their ancient culture. Botswana’s government were made aware of the potential diamonds residing in the Kalahari Reserve in the early 1980’s. They soon argued that the Bushmen require education and health supplies and also that they were interfering with conservation plans for the Kalahari Reserve. However conservation plans were only made when diamonds were found in the Kalahari and the San people had existed without education and health supplies for thousands of years.

In 2002 the Kalahari Bushmen led by Roy Sesana, took the Government of Botswana to court. After two years the case was dismissed on a technicality. However in 2004 they won the right to repeal. As the case continued bribes of water and food continued in purpose built towns and the rights of the Bushmen were removed from the constitution of Botswana. Members of the San were arrested for hunting antelope on the same land that their ancestors had hunted for thousands of years whilst members of the tribe died due to the change in diet and the introduction of new diseases.

In November 2006, based on a finding of 95 Kimberlitic (diamond yielding rock) areas in the Gope area of the Kalahari, Petra Diamonds contracted TH Drilling. Many of the local Bushmen were forced to move into purpose built towns where their voices were silenced with food and water rationing. In one such town: New Xade they were also introduced to Alcohol and as a result sex crimes increased considerably. The Bushmen were also exposed to TB and AIDS which had never been in their lives before. Africa’s most indigenous tribe who prided themselves on their hunting techniques were rendered futile as they were now unemployed with nothing to do but drink and lament in resettlement camps.

Eventually in December 2006 the court voted in favour of the Kalahari Bushmen, citing the Governments case as “unconstitutional”[16]. The Bushmen were free to return to their land. Botswana’s President (at that time) Festus Mogae discharge the San’s case as “nonsense” before adding that their nomadic way of life was a “vestige of the past”.[17] One might assume after such a momentous ruling that the Government of Botswana would change its viewpoint and concentrate on conserving what is the world’s most primordial culture. However, this was not the case.

The courts ruling in 2006 against the Botswana Government was a landmark case as a valuable precedent that could echo throughout Africa. However although the Government hasn’t repelled the ruling it has done everything in its power to impede the return of the Bushmen. This includes reducing water supplies, refusing all hunting permits (contra to the Courts ruling), arresting more then fifty hunters and banning them from taking their herds back into the reserve.[18] These four steps make a return to the Kalahari totally pointless as there is no water or food, hence they will be dependent on the Government for food and water supplies.

In December 2008 Gem Diamonds were granted permission by the Government of Botswana to drill in the Kalahari for diamonds. After assessing the environmental risks it was approved on one condition: that Gem Diamonds do not provide the Kalahari Bushmen with water. However they were employed to drill a waterhole for the wildlife. A consulting firm met with the Bushmen regarding environmental consequences of such an action and to gauge their reactions. Shortly after the Project Manager of the consultation firm joined the board of directors at Gem Diamonds. [19]

The Bushmen don’t speak Setswana (Botswana’s National Language) and rely on translation into their almost extinct languages, however bribes are not uncommon among translators and as the Bushmen are illiterate they only need the thumb print to acknowledge acceptance of a contract. In April 2008 Ian Khama was voted president of Botswana he is one of four out twenty seven board members at Conservation International[20] who is not from the United States, this position offers great leverage against the San people and also secures international support. Any hope of a new departure was quashed as Khama, much in the same vein as Mogae, referred to the Bushman lifestyle as an “archaic fantasy”[21].

Botswana’s democratic government is regarded as a vital factor in the countries economical success. From pre-colonial times Botswana possessed institutions which limited power. During Botswana’s time as a British protectorate the extent of control exercised by the British was minimal compared to other African conquests. Unlike many African States who turned to post-colonial communist regimes, thinking democracy was the tool of a Colonisers, Botswana embraced it applying their own version of it. Democratic elections are held every five years and although it is a multi-party election nonetheless the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since the first election.

The first elected president of Botswana was Chief Khama of the Bamangwato tribe in 1966. Each area and tribe appointed their chief as representative and district counsels were held which would ensure transparency through decentralisation. Decentralisation provides more autonomy to the people and in Botswana’s case “the efforts at decentralisation have yielded the desired results” (Kempe: 531)[22]. Acemoglu et al (2001:32, 33)[23] find that both Khama and the second President of Botswana Quett Masire took good decisions such as delegating power to the Chiefs and cattle owners who would in turn enforce property rights.

Whilst the Governments mining of diamonds provided macro-economic success, on a micro-level opportunities are scarce. When compared with its SSA neighbours Botswana is a success story. However when we examine it as a medium developed country with the world’s highest growth rate since 1966 Botswana can’t compare to any other state with a similar position. The Government may be transparent but they are also the culprits of the wealth inequality and unemployment. According to the African Development Bank (ADB) Botswana’s inequality is caused by the government’s lack of co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation of projects resulting in 30% of the population living below the poverty line (ADB:115)[24]. The Government Services accounted for 17% of GDP in 2003 (ADB:107)[25] and with its excellent reputation it is Botswana’s biggest employer.

This image has affected the entrepreneurial aspect of Botswana, people look for jobs as civil servants instead of setting up businesses or going to college. In 1982 the government set up the Financial Assistance Program (FAP) granting 100% loans to small and medium enterprises (SME). The objective was to provide sustainable economic opportunities and create import and export substitutes. The result was a 100% failure rate. The government was susceptible to fraud and corruption amongst those who availed of the loans. The honest people who set up business inevitably failed due to a lack of business sense and support from the FAP. The FAP was evaluated in 1984, 1988, 1995 and in 2000 when it was finally dissolved. The project had created some jobs but at a huge cost.

The government of Botswana has allowed for unemployment to rise to 24% in 2004 and unofficial estimates put it closer to 40%[26]. The Citizens Entrepreneurial Agency (CEDA) was developed in 2001 to provide “sustainable citizen businesses through funding and mentoring”[27]. Regardless of subsidies or full funding and expertise, government taxation and policies mean that the most prosperous career path will be small cattle farms. Agriculture is the largest area of unemployment, because it is labour intensive therefore AIDS will have a colossal affect on it as workers are physically unable to work. As a result agriculture only accounts for 1.6% of Botswana’s total GDP[28]. The agriculture is often affected by severe drought in the Kalahari making land unworkable Also frequent outbreaks of diseases like Foot and Mouth disease and Cattle Lung disease constantly threaten farming.

Botswana is a large exporter of beef to Europe and in 2008 pledged to commit $1.6m towards Ostrich farming. Whilst this farming model will provide short term bursts the cost of this agriculture model in the long term is a loss in the sustainability of arable land for future generations. Botswana has a population density of three people per square kilometre; this sparse distribution of people can easily serve land farming and could preserve the soils fertility. There are the natural forces of disease and drought that can threaten crops however it is the governments place to correct these. When looking at Botswana on a map it’s most unique feature isn’t being landlocked or its diamond mines, it’s the amount of land that is available for farming outside of Reserve areas. If properly managed this could be the defining feature for Botswana for the next four decades.

In assessing Botswana’s economical success and it’s GDP of $14,300 in 2007 [29] we must remember how small the population is and therefore that wealth is not spread among the workforce but to those working in the diamond industry. Any affluence in Botswana’s economy will stand out per capita simply because of the size of its population. There is also the possible 40% of unemployed people level who do not see this wealth. According to Botswana’s Export and Development Investment Authority[30] there are hopes of Botswana exporting some of the 212 billion metric tonnes of coal to India and China over the next thirty years, however could this be the repeating of the same grave mistake as a high level of AIDS (32%) has been found in coal mining companies like Palapye as recently as December[31].

It is paramount to Botswana’s future to move away from mining on the grounds of health as well as employment. The lifestyle of mining workers in Botswana induces AIDS. The government must realise this. It is pointless to commit to thirty years of mining without making progress in the AIDS crisis. The coal will always be there but the people won’t. Diamonds has risen from 2% of GDP to 45% of GDP since 1966, and today’s government prioritises diamonds above all other elements of Botswana, including life. The official website of Botswana’s government dedicates a full page to Gem Diamonds[32]. Botswana’s first government laid excellent, simple foundations for economic growth. The inherent Dutch Disease wasn’t through mismanagement of the diamond trade but by ignoring the other opportunities hence allowing the economy to boom for one sector only. Anyone who wasn’t directly involved in this trade suffered typically from AIDS or poverty.

To examine the real cost of Botswana’s economical success we must ignore its SSA geographic location. We must treat Botswana as the state with the sixtieth highest GDP in the world. In this regard the cost of its economical success was catastrophic. It includes everyone who died due to AIDS since its discovery there in 1985. These people and their families were entitled to treatment long before 2001. Botswana needs to be more selective when choosing who to work with. Debswana Diamonds only introduced ART for its permanent workers when they realised that they were loosing money due to the disease. The government provides $70m a year in funding towards AIDS, Achap (the Bill and Melinda Gates partnership with Merck Pharmaceuticals) provided $100m over a five year period from 2003-2008.[33] The sooner someone is tested for AIDS the less time it takes to treat them, therefore the more time is allowed to treat other patients. Once a patient reaches the state of intensive care they can take up to ten times as long to care for. The majority of Botswana’s nurses apply for employment in Europe which adds to this problem.

Other people who have suffered at the hands of Diamonds include the people who have endured decades of unemployment and poverty and the consequences of this including: alcoholism and rape which in turn affect other members of society. The education system aspires students to the civil service, and mining industry or medicine if they wish to leave the country. There are an abundance of opportunities in land farming and the government should feel obliged to create these.

The failure of Botswana to diversify its economy in the 1980’s proved very costly in the long term and has lead to an unspecialized and non-ambitious workforce. This will be felt soon with the anticipated decline in diamond production. The FAP and CEDA wasted a lot of funding and time and reinforced the full concentration to mining. In the 1980’s textiles was one of Botswana’s secondary exports however the rise of China and India as low-cost textile producers has eliminated the need for textiles produced in Botswana. The inability of Botswana’s government to anticipate this competition and to react appropriately has led to the demise of this industry.

Botswana is a country that prides itself on its heritage and tribal lineage. Considering the treatment the Kalahari Bushmen received when diamonds were discovered under their feet it seems Botswana can easily ignore thousands of years of traditions and clearly violate the human rights of the oldest living tribe on the planet. It could only be precious diamonds that could cause Presidents Khama and Mogae to turn their back on these people.

Finally, Botswana incurred the real cost of economical success. A government founded in 1966 based on tribal values was transformed into a booming nation for one reason which turned seemingly incorrupt politicians against their own people and tribes causing alcoholism, unemployment and widespread disease and poverty in order to expose one resource.

In 2008 Botswana’s former President, Festus Mogae received a $5m prize as well as $200,000 a year for the rest of his life as a reward for apparently “good governance”. This was the same man that wanted the ancient Bushmen of the Kalahari unemployed in urban resettlement towns.

“President Mogae’s outstanding leadership has ensured Botswana’s continued stability and prosperity”
Kofi Annan”[34]

Bibliography

“African Development Outlook 2004/05” African Development Bank. Development Centre. OECD

“African Success Story” Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A Robinson. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3219.
“Botswana: fencing out the equity issue. Cattleposts and cattle ranching in the Kalahari Desert” J. S. Perkins 1996 Academic Press Limited

“Culture and Customs of Botswana” James Raymond Denbow, Phenyo C Thebe Greenwood Publishing group 2006

“Decentralisation and local governance theory and the practice in Botswana” Ronald Hope Kempe. Development Southern Africa Vol 17, No 4, October 2000

“Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries” Landis MacKellar, Andreas Wörgötter, Julia Wörz. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Transition Economics No. 14. January 2000.
“Preventing Famine” By Donald Curtis, Michael Hubbard, Andrew Shepherd Ruteledge, Taylor and Francis. 1988

“The Bottom Billion” Paul Collier. Oxford University Press, 2007

“The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Botswana” (UNDP) Econsult Executive Summary 2007
“The State of Africa” Martin Meredith. Free Press, 2006

“The White Mans Burden” William Russell Easterly. Penguin Press 2006

Endnotes

[1] Martin Meredith “The State of Africa” Free Press, 2006.
[2] www.transparency.org/content/download/28010/422211/file/NIS_Botswana_report_2007.pdf
[3] Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Transition Economics No. 14. January 2000: “Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries” Landis MacKellar, Andreas Wörgötter, Julia Wörz.ationsökonomie / Transition Economics Series
[4] Through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly. http://www.undp.org/mdg/goal8.shtml
[5] http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/mdg.html#status
[6] Paul Collier. “The Bottom Billion”. Oxford University Press, 2007.
[7] http://www.debswana.com/Debswana.Web/About+Debswana/History+and+Profile/
[8] http://www.afdiamonds.com/wad/view/wad/en/page499
[9] http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/botswana_statistics.html#45
[10] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3235944.stm
[11] Econsult Executive Summary “The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Botswana” (UNDP) 2007
[12] http://www.igh.org/surveillance/modules/afro/1/1_slides/M1_U2.ppt #344,11,Figure 2.5. Percentage of Workforce lost to AIDS
[13] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3235944.stm
[14] http://unbotswana.org.bw/undp/news_210507.html
[15] http://www.aids2006.org/Web/TUAC0103.ppt
[16] http://www.survival-international.org/tribes/bushmen/courtcase
[17] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3865403.stm
[18] http://www.survival-international.org/tribes/bushmen
[19] http://www.survival-international.org/news/4007
[20] http://www.conservation.org/discover/about_us/team/bod/Pages/default.aspx
[21] http://www.survival-international.org/news/4017
[22] Ronald Hope Kempe “Decentralisation and local governance theory and the practice in Botswana” Development Southern Africa Vol 17, No 4, October 2000
[23] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A Robinson “African Success Story” 2001
[24] African Development Bank, Development Centre. OECD “African Development Outlook 2004/05”
[25] African Development Bank, Development Centre. OECD “African Development Outlook 2004/05”
[26] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html
[27] http://www.ceda.co.bw/article.php?id_mnu=21
[28] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html
[29] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html
[30] http://www.bedia.co.bw/news/news.php?NewsID=7
[31] http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20090108
[32] http://www.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=5&id=15&Itemid=27
[33] http://www.achap.org/media.html
[34] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7679391.stm